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Abstract: 
What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Using 
unique archival data on collateralized lending, we show that personal experience can affect 
individual risk-taking and aggregate leverage. When an investor syndicate speculating in 
Amsterdam in 1772 went bankrupt, many lenders were exposed. In the end, none of them 
actually lost money. Nonetheless, only those at risk of losing money changed their behavior 
markedly – they lent with much higher haircuts. The rest continued as before. The differential 
change is remarkable since the distress was public knowledge. Overall leverage in the 
Amsterdam stock market declined as a result.  
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Leverage in financial markets is not constant over time. Lending is typically pro-cyclical – high 
and increasing in good times, and much lower when asset prices fall (Adrian and Shin 2010). For 
example, when the stock market crashed after Lehman’s bankruptcy in 2008, “haircuts” 1 
increased sharply and the volume of collateralized lending collapsed (Gorton and Metrick 2012; 
Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov 2012). Pro-cyclical “leverage cycles” affect the risk bearing 
capacity of financial intermediaries and can contribute to large changes in asset prices (He and 
Krishnamurthy 2013). The resulting innovations to asset prices are observationally equivalent to 
shocks to risk aversion, which contribute importantly to price swings in the aggregate (Campbell 
and Cochrane 1995; Cochrane 2011).  
What causes changes in leverage and risk-bearing capacity is less clear. Regulatory and 
technical constraints – such as VAR limits – as well as changes in behavior can help to 
rationalize large shifts in credit provided to financial markets (Adrian and Shin 2010; 
Geanakoplos 2010). Several contributions to the literature on pro-cyclical leverage argue that 
volatility of asset prices is greater in bad states of the world (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2005; 
Vayanos 2004). Fostel and Geneakoplos (2008) rationalize the positive correlation between bad 
news and volatility in a setting with heterogeneous agents. Higher volatility can lead to a drop in 
leverage. Related work argues that beliefs and/or risk preferences are not constant over time, but 
change in response to personal experience. Krishnamurty (2009) shows theoretically how 
Knightian uncertainty can increase in crisis times; Malmendier and Nagel (2011) demonstrate 
that individuals who experienced the Great Depression invested systematically less in equities, 
even after controlling for age, gender, and income. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011) show 
that during the recent financial crisis, investors in Italy became markedly more risk averse. Key 
challenges in this literature are to show that changes in behavior are not simply a reflection of 
lower wealth, and that changes in attitudes can alter aggregate market outcomes.2  
This paper demonstrates that lenders’ personal experience can lead to counter-cyclical 
haircuts in financial markets, creating pro-cyclical leverage. This is true even in the absence of 
any changes to personal wealth. We focus on margin loans in the 18th century Amsterdam stock 
                                                 
1 The difference between the market value of the asset and the loan value in the lending agreement, the reciprocal of 
leverage. 
2 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2011) find no correlation with wealth, consumption patterns, or other sources of 
risk. They also conduct an experiment where subjects watch a scary video and are then asked to participate in a 
trading game, and show that this is associated with a marked reduction in risk tolerance. Brunnermeier and Nagel  
(2008) conclude that wealth fluctuations only have minor effects on risk tolerance. 
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market. This setting has three advantages. First, loans were collateralized with securities with 
readily observed market prices – leverage can easily be measured by the haircuts imposed. 
Second, because lending was secured, borrower characteristics were of minor importance. This 
allows us to focus on lender behavior (rather than borrower characteristics) as a determinant of 
haircuts. Third, this historical episode allows us to identify the effects of personal experience on 
risk-taking. Using hand-collected data from notary archives, we analyze financial distress in 18th 
century Amsterdam. The Seppenwolde syndicate speculated in East India Company stock. 
Lenders to the syndicate were at risk of significant financial losses, but escaped unharmed. 
Uncertainty was resolved within a matter of weeks. Financiers who had lent to the syndicate 
before became more conservative, and aggregate leverage declined. Before the crisis, collateral 
requirements of lenders to the Seppenwoldes were indistinguishable from the rest of the market. 
Suddenly, after the Seppenwolde bankruptcy, lenders involved with the syndicate only extended 
loans with markedly higher haircuts (Figure 1). The average rose from 20 to almost 30% within 
six months. Other lenders – not at risk of personal losses – conducted business as usual.  
Major lenders to the stricken syndicate changed their behavior, influencing aggregate 
market conditions. The tightening of collateral requirements in the Amsterdam secured lending 
market after Christmas 1772 is fully explained by former financiers of the syndicate becoming 
more cautious. At the same time, interest rates on loans extended by both groups of lenders 
remained unchanged (Figure B. 1). The types of securities that were funded with margin loans 
(mainly East India Company stock) also did not change after the bankruptcy. Importantly, 
although haircuts of exposed and non-exposed lenders eventually began to converge (after a 
year), the effect remains visible for as long as we have data – a one-off, large shock changed the 
behavior of major players substantially and for an extended period. 
 Why did the Amsterdam market feature different haircuts for the same type of collateral? 
In other words, why did borrowers not simply shift towards lenders that were not affected by the 
Seppenwolde bankruptcy? Borrowers had to search for potential lenders. Who they matched with 
depended on who happened to have liquidity available for a loan at the right moment. Our 
identification relies on this accidental timing of liquidity needs. After Christmas 1772, unaffected 
lenders were generally in short supply; and borrowers had to settle for higher haircuts if their 
funding need happened to coincide with available funds in the hands of an affected lender. We 
lay out these argument in a model in the spirit of Geanakoplos (2003). In the same vein as 
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Geanakoplos’ analysis of repo lending, we argue that collateralized lending reflects investor 
heterogeneity: Those who are optimistic about future values of a risky asset borrow, while 
pessimists lend. In equilibrium, speculation in risky securities is financed by contracts involving 
minimal risk to the lenders; the cost of risky contracts would be prohibitive from the perspective 
of the borrower.3 Fluctuations in haircuts reflect changes in the level of disagreement between 
investors about the payoff of an asset or shifts in investor characteristics, such as the share of 
optimists and pessimists.4  
 The distress episode in the Amsterdam stock market in December 1772 allows us to test 
the implications of the Geneakoplos model directly. By only affecting one set of investors – and 
their lenders – it increased lender heterogeneity. We interpret the differential impact on collateral 
requirements as evidence in favor of the heterogeneous belief model of collateralized lending. 
Having only narrowly escaped from losses, affected lenders became more pessimistic; consistent 
with Geneakoplos (2003), they demanded higher haircuts. In our historical setting at least, 
personal experience caused a shift in behavior that was sufficiently large to generate pro-cyclical 
leverage in the aggregate. We are able to identify the effect of personal experience through 
differences in haircuts charged by different types of lenders. We can observe this variation 
because of the search-and-matching process. If haircuts had been set in a centralized market, 
shifts in risk-taking would have had similar effects – a significant change in average risk-appetite 
would change leverage, but it would be harder to demonstrate the link with differential changes 
in investor behavior. Other factors cannot explain this pro-cyclicality of haircuts in 1770s 
Amsterdam. Losses amongst intermediaries, which may have played an important role in the 
recent crisis (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2005; Adrian and Shin 2010), were unimportant. 5 
Instead, the price fall was probably exogenous, driven by the arrival of negative news about 
fundamentals in Bengal. Lenders at risk of losing money then reduced the riskiness of their 
lending by raising collateral requirements. Despite the decline in effective funding for 
speculators, the subsequent decline in prices was limited and reverted within a matter of week. 
                                                 
3 In the Geneakoplos model, agents with more optimistic beliefs want to lever up to invest in the asset. Pessimistic 
agents do not want to hold the asset directly, but are willing to lend to the optimists on the collateral of the asset. The 
equilibrium contract turns out to be risk free. The haircut is set such that even in the worst possible state of the world 
lenders are fully repaid. From a borrower’s perspective it is prohibitively expensive to contract a risky loan with a 
lower haircut – he expects to pay a risk premium that, from his perspective, is disproportionally high. 
4 Simsek (2013) uses a Geneakoplos-style model to analyse the effects of various types of disagreement between 
optimists and pessimists.  
5 For a historical example, cf. Schnabel and Shin (2004). 
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No “loss spirals” followed the sharp shift in haircuts. Also, because lenders did not suffer any 
actual losses, the increase in haircuts cannot reflect an increase in (wealth-dependent) risk 
aversion. Finally, increases in haircuts were not driven by regulatory constraints, such as VAR 
limits, which drive fire sales (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). 
 Our research contributes to the literature on asset prices and heterogeneous beliefs more 
generally. Differences in beliefs can be important for asset pricing (Miller 1977; Harrison and 
Kreps 1978; Jarrow 1980; Hong and Stein 2007). Where these differences come from is an area 
of active research interest. Agents may have access to different information sets – perhaps as a 
result of word-of-mouth effects (Brunnermeier 2001; Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2005a) 6 –, or 
different beliefs as a result of their own experiences. The latter is often called reinforcement 
learning (Camerer and Hua Ho 1999; Erev and Roth 1998). A number of contributions look at 
the impact of experience on decision making in financial markets (Choi et al. 2009; Greenwood 
and Nagel 2009; Kaustia and Knüpfer 2008; and Vissing-Jorgenson 2003). 7 Malmendier and 
Nagel (2011, 2012) show that both the Great Depression and high inflation in the 1970s 
influenced expectations and behavior. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011) argue that 
experiencing a financial crisis can induce a big change in risk appetite (as can the watching of 
horror films). In the same spirit, Heath and Tversky (1991) conclude that the willingness to take 
risks declines sharply with distrust in one’s own judgement. Murfin (2012) shows that banks 
impose stricter loan covenants when they suffer losses on their loan portfolios.  More generally, 
our works connects with research on the determinants of attitudes and beliefs more generally.8  
Our paper also contributes to the literature using historical data on haircuts as a measure 
of expectations. Rappoport and White (1994) argue that increasing margin requirements in the 
run-up to the 1929 crash on the NYSE reflected growing worries about a coming crash. Temin 
and Voth (2004) argue that haircuts in lending against stock during the South Sea bubble suggest 
that investors were “riding” the bubble. Schnabel and Shin (2004) argue that leverage cycles 
                                                 
6  Social networks can shape investor attitudes (Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2005b) and attitudes more generally 
(Acemoglu and Jackson 2011); social capital can boost trust in the stock market (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
2008a).  
7 A formal model of experience-based belief formation is Piketty (1995). 
8 Malmendier and Tate (2007) and Graham and Narasimhan (2004) find that corporate managers who were born 
before the Great Depression make more conservative capital structure decisions. Malmendier, Tate, and Yann 
(2011) find that CEOs with a military background act systematically differently as leaders of firms. Personal 
experience may also be a prime determinant of differences in beliefs. For cultural persistence and change more 
broadly, cf. Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2007) and Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales (2008b).  
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created contagion and falling asset prices in the Amsterdam financial crisis of 1763 (Quinn and 
Roberds 2012).  
We proceed as follows. Section I discusses the historical background and goes into the 
details of the 18th century secured lending contracts. In addition, we provide more information 
about the events in 1772.  Section II lays out a simple model of secured lending. Section III 
describes our data. Section IV presents the main empirical results, and section V considers a 
variety of extensions and robustness checks. Section VI concludes. 
I. Historical Background 
In this section, we first summarize the main characteristics of the collateralized lending contracts 
in 18th century Amsterdam. We then describe how the market for these loans operated in normal 
times. To understand the Seppenwolde crisis in late 1772, we explain briefly the situation of the 
East India Company at this time. Finally, we describe the investment syndicate’s bankruptcy and 
how the authorities dealt with the crisis, as well as subsequent developments in the market for 
collateralized loans. 
I.A. Collateralized Lending in 18th century Amsterdam 
The market for secured lending (“beleeningen”) in 18th century Amsterdam was well developed, 
and resembles the market for margin loans in modern-day markets. It can be traced back to the 
early days of trading in Dutch East India Company stock during the early 17th century 
(Gelderblom and Jonker 2004). By the 1640s, lending against stock had developed into a mature, 
standardized market (Petram 2011). From the 18th century onwards, English securities were used 
as collateral, including stock British East India Company stock (EIC). Three features are 
important. First, lending took place without intermediaries – almost no third parties were 
involved in secured lending. Instead, borrower and lender interacted directly. Second, there was 
no centralized market where a uniform price was set and the market cleared. Rather, the market 
worked through search-and-matching, with borrowers and lenders having to find each other. 
Third, loans were renewable and of standardized length. This meant that either renewals or new 
lending occurred every six months, if a lender did not exit the business. Borrowers typically had 
to find a lender whose earlier loan had just been repaid.  
Appendix A provides the transcript of a typical contract. A borrower received a sum of 
money from the lender and in return posted collateral. In the 18th century, ownership took the 
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form of an entry in the equity ledger of the company. For secured lending, the security in 
question was transferred from the account of the borrower to that of the lender. When the loan 
expired and the lender was repaid, the share was transferred back to the borrower. This is similar 
to today’s margin loan agreements. Each contract stipulated an interest rate, the amount, and the 
value of collateral. The haircut is the fraction of the collateral not financed with the loan. While 
the standard period for a secured loan contract was 6 months, a few contracts ran for 3 or 12 
months. Lending agreements were often “rolled over”, i.e. extended by additional (fixed) periods 
of 6 months. The data we use in this paper generally refers to new contracts, not to renewals. 
The contracts specified critical price points when more collateral had to be posted. 
Assume that a loan had an initial 25% haircut, and the underlying stock was trading at 220%.9 A  
price decline below 200% meant that extra funds had to be provided to restore the haircut to 
22.5%. Additional price declines of at least 10 percentage points required more margin.10 If the 
borrower was not able to meet margin calls, the lender had the right to liquidate the borrower’s 
position. The collateral was already in the lender’s name; it could be sold right away. Other 
creditors had no claim on this collateral. Lenders were entitled to the value of the loan and 
interest only. Any surplus left after liquidation had to be remitted to the borrower. If the proceeds 
failed to cover principal and interest, the borrower was personally liable for the residual.  
The 18th century market for collateralized lending was highly decentralized. Direct 
lending between borrowers and lenders dominated. Only around 5% of transactions featured 
financial intermediaries. There was considerable dispersion in the level of haircuts – the market 
did not clear at a single haircut. Figure C. 1 shows that, even conditional on a borrower’s identity 
and the year a transaction took place, there was considerable heterogeneity in haircuts.  
Borrowers and lenders were typically neither related nor former business associates. 
Repeat lending was not common (other than through renewals). Rather, the matching of 
borrowers and lenders took place through search. A borrower would actively look for an 
individual who could fund a position (or vice versa). The specific lender had to have sufficient 
funds available at the right time. Often, the lender had just received the repayment of an earlier 
                                                 
9 In the 18th century prices were quoted as percentage of nominal (face) value. 
10 The initial haircut can be disaggregated into two components. The first element is the “distance to margin call”, in 
this case the difference between 220 and 200%, or 0.09 of the value of the collateral. The second is “distance to 
loss”, in this case 200% to 165% or 0.16 of the value of the collateral. If margin calls were honored, the “distance to 
loss” increased by 10 the moment the price fell below 200.   
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loan. The lender Denis Adrien Roest provides a good example of this. Roest was a wealthy 
rentier who frequently extended loans for the purchase of English securities. Figure 2 shows how 
Roest extended loans over time. He typically lent again after receiving the repayment of older 
loans. Since loans ran for a multiple of 6 (or 12) months, Roest’s new loans were either extended 
in May (November) or June (December). Throughout the sample, new loans are made with high 
frequency at dates that are a multiple of 6 months after an earlier loan had been made. This 
institutional feature of the lending market also implies that most transactions were driven by a 
confluence of funding need and availability.  
In general, rich rentiers from the merchant and regent class lent to stock market 
speculators against collateral. Table 1 presents key characteristics, separated for lenders with and 
without exposure to the consortium. Categories are partially overlapping; percentages do not add 
up to 100%. Only around half of the lenders were involved in commercial activities. Another 
half were full time rentiers. A third of the lenders worked for the government or in the judiciary. 
Another third were members of the nobility. Around a fifth of lenders was female. Finally, a few 
lenders were specialists, i.e. individuals or firms who both lent and borrowed in the securities 
market (such as the brokerage firm of David Pereira and Sons).  
Lenders who financed the stricken Seppenwolde consortium were broadly similar to the 
rest. They were slightly more likely to be active in commerce, although the difference is not 
statistically significant. A lower fraction was active in government or the judiciary, but this 
difference is also not significant. Those who ended up exposed to the Seppenwolde syndicate 
lent less to specialists, and more to Jews and merchants.11 The differences are small and mostly 
insignificant, except for the case of merchants (88 vs 96%). Average loan volume per transaction 
was nearly identical for lenders exposed to the syndicate as compared to the rest. The interest 
rate charged was also nearly identical. There was a difference in the proportion of lending 
backed by East India stock – a factor for which we will control explicitly below. 
Repeat lending between the same borrower and creditor was rare. Of all lenders, a full 
45% only lent once in the years 1770-75; another 26% lent 2 or 3 times. Only 3 percent of 
lenders engaged in more than 10 transactions. The borrower side is similar – 38% of borrowers 
only engaged in one transaction, and another 35% participated in 2 or 3. Only 10% of the sample 
                                                 
11 We exclude loans to the Seppenwolde syndicate from the analysis of borrowers, to ensure comparability of 
lending behavior to borrowers outside the stricken investor group. 
9 
 
borrowed ten or more times. The overwhelming majority of transactions did not feature repeat 
lending – over 80% of transactions in our data featured lenders and borrowers who had never 
done business with each other.  
Figure 3 shows the network of lenders and borrowers. Collateral values determine the 
thickness of the lines. The Seppenwoldes were a “spider in the web”, borrowing from many 
financiers. As is readily apparent, there are few exclusive (or privileged) lending relationships – 
many borrowers have multiple lenders, and most lenders provide loans to more than borrower. 
The only exception is the Seppenwolde syndicate, to which many lenders only lend once. In 
Appendix B we test more formally if random matching of lenders and borrowers can adequately 
explain the nature of lending in our sample. Specifically we calculate the Herfindahl index of 
every lender’s loan portfolio during the pre-crisis period. We find that loan portfolios were not 
more concentrated than one would expect based on the random matching of borrowers and 
lenders. In other words, lenders did not specialize in lending to specific individual borrowers.  
I.B. The EIC in 1772 
The bankruptcy unfolded immediately after Christmas 1772. EIC stock prices had been falling 
for some time (Figure 4) for EIC stock prices between 1723 and 1794). The EIC’s problems 
originated in Bengal. In 1757 the British had defeated the local rulers; in 1765 the EIC took over 
collection of local taxes. The resulting windfall was used to raise dividends; the EIC stock price 
increased from about 170% to 270%. However, the Company’s (military) expenses increased 
substantially. In addition, eventually, revenues fell. The company squeezed the local population 
harder. This contributed to the infamous Bengali famine of 1769-1773, killing millions while 
undermining the Company’s financial position. Nevertheless, the company even increasing 
dividends in March 1771. The shortfall was financed through credit. Local company men in 
India borrowed heavily through short term bills (drawn on the Company in London) and at home 
the Bank of England granted the company substantial loans. Information about the worsened 
state of the Company was kept secret. Company directors, many of them holding large positions 
of EIC stock and afraid of the consequences for stock prices, were unwilling to reduce dividends. 
Eventually, matters came to a head. During the summer of 1772, the EIC had trouble rolling over 
its debt and in September 1772 the Company was finally forced to scale back its dividends. 
Stock prices plummeted. After this, more bad news surfaced and stock prices kept falling. In the 
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end the government intervened, placing the Company under more direct control through the 
Regulating Act of 1773 (Sutherland 1952). EIC stock prices stayed at depressed levels. 
I.C. Events after Christmas 1772 
In 1771, a group of Dutch financiers led by the Van Seppenwolde brothers took a large position 
in EIC stock. The EIC’s price had fallen from 270% in 1768 to about 220%. Not knowing what 
was happening behind the scenes in London, the consortium speculated on a rebound in stock 
prices. It used the Amsterdam market for securitized lending to finance its positions. These were 
considerable, totaling almost 6% of all outstanding stock. In addition to EIC stock, the 
consortium also held a significant position in Bank of England stock. Other investors went short 
in 1772, including the English speculator Alexander Fordyce – who was forced to close his 
positions just weeks before prices began to fall.12 
Table 2 gives an overview of the participants of the consortium and their holdings around 
Christmas 1772. Backing the consortium were two famous merchant bankers, Clifford and Sons 
and Abraham ter Borch and Sons, who provided a large share of the equity necessary to finance 
these positions.13 The price fall of EIC stock devastated the consortium’s position in the second 
half of 1772. Most secured loans had been contracted while the EIC price stood around 220%. 
The covenants stipulated that if the price fell below 200%, additional collateral had to be posted. 
With every additional price fall of 10%, margins had to be replenished. When, in the second half 
of 1772, the EIC stock price fell first below 200%, 190% and 180%, the consortium managed to 
meet these additional margin calls (SAA, Van den Brink, 10,593 - 10,613; NA, Staal van 
Piershil, 381; GAR, 90, 52). However, when the EIC stock price fell below 170% after 
Christmas 1772, the consortium’s equity was wiped out. No further margin calls could be 
honored. All firms involved, including the two big players in the background, Clifford and Ter 
Borch, “broke” and went bankrupt.  
From December 28 onwards a string of "insinuaties", or official payment orders were 
issued, requiring the borrowers to post additional margin (SAA, Van Den Brink, 10,602, see also 
                                                 
12 Kindleberger’s survey (2005) linked the bankruptcy of the Seppenwolde syndicate with Fordyce and the fall of the 
Ayr bank, claiming that the crisis began the summer of 1772. Similarly, Neal (1990) argues that the crisis started in 
October. This is mistaken. It is only after Christmas 1772 that problems emerged for the Seppenwolde syndicate. 
The official bankruptcy date is December 27 (SAA, "Stukken betreffende"; Wilson 1941). There is no evidence that 
Fordyce was linked with the syndicate; Wilson shows that he was speculating on a fall in EIC prices. 
13 SAA, ‘Stukken betreffende’; NA, Staal van Piershil, 386, 396; OSA 3710; GAR, 90, 56. Cf also Wilson (1941) 
and Sautijn Kluit (1865). 
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Wilson 1941). Since these calls could not be met, lenders had the right to sell the collateral 
immediately in order to recoup their funds. Any profits above the value of the loans would 
accrue to the consortium; losses would be the problem of the lenders. Figure 5 shows the timing 
of these transactions (as far as they can be reconstructed). The gray bars indicate the time the 
official payment orders were issued; the black bars indicate actual transactions. There was a 
significant lag between these two, indicating that sales were delayed. Most transactions were 
completed by the end of January 1773.  
Around the time the margin calls were issued the median surplus was around 10%, this 
includes any unpaid interests. Under normal circumstances lenders would have had a 
comfortable margin to liquidate the collateral. However, since many transactions were delayed, 
and prices after Christmas 1772 kept falling, the surplus at liquidation was often significantly 
lower - many lenders liquidated at a surplus of just 2 or 3 % (see Figure C. 2).14 Nevertheless, the 
surplus at liquidation was always positive. In other words, although lenders got close, in the end 
they escaped without losses. 
It is unclear why lenders were waiting for several weeks to liquidate the collateral. At 
best, lenders could hope for full repayment of principal and any remaining interest payments. 
They had no upside from higher prices in the future, and instead would lose if prices fell even 
further. Figure C. 2 suggests that a large fraction of lenders only sold when they got close to 
losing money. It is possible that liquidity on the Amsterdam exchange initially dried up.  Figure 
5 provides some support for this interpretation; it shows that EIC prices in Amsterdam were 
significantly below those in London. Since there was normally a close relationship between the 
two prices, driven by the possibility of arbitrage (Koudijs 2013a), this suggests local selling 
pressure. Limited liquidity may have made it difficult to sell securities. However, most lenders 
could afford to sell at a discount of up to 10% without losing a penny. This would suggest that 
the market had come to a virtual standstill.15 
                                                 
14 The surplus at the time of liquidation cannot be reconstructed for every loan. Corroborating evidence comes from 
Johannes van Seppenwolde’s bankruptcy papers (SAA, Tex den Bondt aanvulling 1 en 2, 347). They list all of his 
assets and liabilities. The overview is complete, including everything from real estate to unpaid attorney fees. Not a 
single collateralized lending transaction in English securities led to a claim on the bankrupt estate (instead they all 
ended up on the asset side). Losses due to collateralized loans were pari passu with other claims – this means that 
they cannot have been repaid before the bankruptcy papers were drawn up. For example, a number of collateralized 
loans that had plantation mortgages as collateral did end up as claims in Van Seppenwolde’s bankruptcy papers. 
15 To avoid a general fire sale, the consortium often asked for sales to be suspended “because of the circumstances” 
(“…vermits de omstandigheeden […] hij vriendelijk versogt eenige tijd stil te zitten”) (SAA, Van Den Brink, 
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These events were extensively covered in the press. On December 29, the periodical De 
Koopman reported a scarcity of buyers on the exchange. It explicitly mentioned that margin calls 
had been issued and that collateral would have to be sold. In addition, secured loans were 
difficult to obtain, “only on additional security” (De Koopman, p. 295). On January 3, the 
Koopman mentioned that many more margin calls had to be met and more selling was imminent. 
Reflecting on developments in the market, the periodical expressed the hope that “reality will 
become more fashionable now people are learning these specific lessons” (De Koopman, p. 310). 
In mid-January it was reported that “bargains were to be had on the exchange” (De Koopman, p. 
338).  
After Christmas 1772, there was more turmoil on the Amsterdam exchange. The 
bankruptcy of old and renowned banks increased counterparty risk; credit, often in the form of 
short term bills, dried up (SAA, Beleenkamer, 1; Sautijn Kluit 1865; Wilson 1966). Nonetheless, 
the Amsterdam market calmed down relatively quickly. On January 14, 1773 the city of 
Amsterdam set up a discount facility where, on the security of domestic government bonds and 
non-perishable goods, anyone could borrow money. It was hardly used; of 2 to 3 million guilders 
available, only 335,000 were lent out (SAA, Beleenkamer, 1 and 5). The official records mention 
that setting up the facility alone had restored the ‘general credit’. Afterwards, no more 
suspensions of payment occurred (SAA, Beleenkamer, 1). 
How unusual was the behavior of the EIC stock price in 1772? We measure returns as the 
log difference of prices over a six-month period, the standard term for secured loan contracts: 
. Table 3 describes the data for three time periods – the years from the beginning 
of our sample in 1723 to the first half of 1772, prior to the distress period; an event window 
during which the Seppenwolde episode occurred; and the full sample from 1723 to 1794. 
On average, East India stock appreciated by half a percent over a six-month horizon 
during the half-century from 1723 to 1772. Returns during the Seppenwolde episode were 
dramatically lower, with prices declining by an average of 3.4 percent over the average six 
month period between the beginning of 1770 and January 1773. The standard deviation is only 
slightly higher, but skewness is markedly more negative for the sample including the first week 
of 1773. The maximum loss over a six-month horizon increased from 25.6 to 35.8 percent. 
                                                                                                                                                             
10,602). Since there was no direct upside from liquidating at a profit, this equilibrium might have been stable, as 
long as there were some reputation costs from deviating and the surplus remaining on the positions was sufficient. 
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Figure C. 3 plots kernel densities. The shift in distributions during the distress period markedly 
increased the weight in the left “tail”. Prior to the second half of 1772, priced dipped by 20% or 
more in only 1.1 percent of all cases. Since average haircuts were 20%, this implies that in only 
one out of 100 lending events, the collateral values fell below the value of a loan. During the 
period 1770-1/1773, this frequency increased to over 7 percent. 
II. Model 
The historical background section showed that lenders mostly offered funds to borrowers who 
happened to need credit when one of the lenders’ earlier loans expired. Only a few lenders and 
borrowers were in a position to do business with each other at any one point in time. In this 
section, we model their interactions in a search-and-matching framework. We set up a general 
equilibrium model of haircuts based on Geneakoplos (2003) and Simsek (2013) featuring 
heterogeneous beliefs. We analyse the case where borrowers’ beliefs (the agents taking a 
position in the market) remain unchanged, but the beliefs of lenders diverge. More specifically, a 
fraction of lenders becomes more pessimistic than before. The aim is to analyse the impact on 
haircuts (and interest rates). In addition, we establish conditions under which borrowers find it 
optimal to accept loans from more pessimistic lenders.16 
II.A. Asset market and agents 
The model has an infinite time horizon. Time is continuous. There are two assets, a risk-free 
asset in fully elastic supply (with a risk-free rate normalized to zero) and a risky asset in unit 
supply that has a random payout  The timing of the payout of the asset is unknown – for 
simplicity we assume that in each period, there is a fixed probability  that the asset pays out 
(conditional on not having paid out before). This captures the opportunity costs agents might 
face when they do not have a position in the asset. We assume that the asset has two possible 
payoffs,  and  with . For simplicity we assume that these outcomes are equally likely. 
Trade in the asset takes place in a centralized market, generating a price . 
There are three types of agents in the economy indexed by . Each type of agent 
has mass  Agents differ principally in their beliefs about the payoff of the asset. Specifically, 
agents agree about the good payoff of the asset  but have different expectations about . Agents 
of type 1 are most pessimistic, agents of type 3 are most optimistic. Agents of type 2 take an 
                                                 
16 The proofs for all propositions and lemmas are in Appendix E. 
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intermediate position. In other words . The expected value of the asset for each type 
of agent is given by . Agents have cash endowments . For simplicity we assume 
that cash constraints are only binding for agents of type 3. Agents are risk neutral and have a 
zero discount rate.  
II.B. Lending market and matching technology 
Contracting in our economy is constrained. Agents can simply buy and hold the asset and they 
can sign loan contracts with each other. Shorting is not allowed.17 The loan contracts that agents 
sign with each are collateralized with the asset and have limited commitment. Because of the 
random payoff of the asset loans can be potentially risky.  
We focus on equilibria where  such that only agents of type 3 will want to 
invest in the asset. Agents of type 3 can borrow money from the agents to lever up their 
investment. We assume that these margin loans can be obtained through decentralized. More 
specifically, type 3 agents search counterparties from groups 1 and 2 with intensity . Whether 
they are matched to a type 1 or type 2 agents is random and depends on their relative presence in 
the market. At any moment in time there are  matches between type 3 and type 1 agents and 
 matches between type 3 and type 2 agents. Each loan has face value   where, for each unit of 
the asset pledged, the borrower receives  units of money to invest. Whenever a type 3 agent 
finds a counterparty, they negotiate over the haircut ( ) and interest rate ( ) of the 
contract. For simplicity we assume that the borrower has all bargaining power and manages so 
extract all surplus from the match. This means that the interest rate only reflects (potential) risk 
and not market power.18 In addition, we assume that a loan contract ends randomly at a given 
time with probability  (conditional on a loan still running). This captures the fact that a loan 
contract may or may not be extended after its initial maturity. 
II.C. Equilibrium 
We study the steady state equilibrium of the model. 
Definition. Define  and  as the decision rules for the agent of type 3 to accept a loan 
from agents 2 and 3 respectively. Define  and  as the steady state populations of 
type 1 and 2 agents that are matched to a type 3 agent. A steady state equilibrium is a 
                                                 
17 This captures the feature that shorting in 18th century Amsterdam was possible but not accessible to all market 
participants, effectively creating short selling constraints (Koudijs 2013b).  
18 See Appendix B for a discussion of what would happen if we relax this assumption. 
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combination of matching rules  and , loan sizes  and , matched populations  
and  and an asset price  such that all types maximize expected payoffs.  
Decision rules  and  determine whether it is optimal for a borrower to accept a loan from 
agents of types 1 and 2. Type 1 agents are more pessimistic and being matched with them is less 
desirable than with type 2 agents. A borrower might be tempted to reject the match and wait for a 
borrower of type 2 to come along. Whether this is optimal or not depends on the following trade-
off. On the one hand a match with a type 1 lender locks a borrower into a less desirable contract 
for a prolonged period of time (determined by ). On the other hand, waiting and staying outside 
of the market has significant opportunity costs. Type 2 lenders are in fixed supply (determined 
by ) and as a result a borrower might need to wait for a long time until he meets with a 
type 2 agent. In the meantime the asset could pay off (with probability ) and the borrower will 
lose out on an expected positive return. We focus on a "full matching" equilibrium where the 
borrower always accepts a match with type 1 lenders, i.e. . We explicitly derive the 
conditions under which this is optimal.  
II.D. Solution 
The first key element of the equilibrium can be expressed as follows.  
Proposition 1. For any steady state equilibrium all loan contracts will be risk free, i.e. 
 and .  
The intuition behind this result is similar to the one in Geneakoplos (2003). Suppose that the 
borrower and lender decided to sign a risky contract. In the bad state of the world ( ), the 
lender expects to lose a large amount of money. In the good state of the world he will charge a 
high interest rate to compensate for this. In contrast, the borrower expects losses in the bad state 
to be limited; he believes the lender will be able to recuperate a large fraction of the loan. As a 
result, from his perspective, the risky interest rate is disproportionally high. This makes risky 
borrowing expensive. In equilibrium, borrowing will therefore not exceed the risk free amount. 
This pins down the loan size and, taking prices as given, the haircut. 
We next establish under what conditions the full matching equilibrium ( ) 
actually exists. Denote by   the value of the type 3 agent from obtaining a loan from a type 1 or 
2 agent ( ) or from not obtaining a loan at all ( ) where . A steady state 
equilibrium with  exists when , or, in other words, when it is optimal for the 
type 3 agent to accept a match with a type 1 agent.  
Proposition 2. Define  as the threshold price for which , with  
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As long as   
where  is implicitly defined by the following flow equations and market clearing:  
 and      (1)  
        (2) 
The intuition for this result is that the full matching equilibrium exists when  is lower than 
some upper bound . A higher price is associated with more credit availability due to more 
matches (a more efficient matching technology ) and relatively more type 2 ( ) than type 1 
( ) loan contracts. These are exactly the conditions under which it would be optimal for a type 
3 agent to reject a loan from a type 1 lender and wait for a type 2 agent to come along. The upper 
bound  is higher (and the condition less binding) when  is relatively large. In other words, a 
borrower will decide to accept a loan from a type 1 lender when he is relatively less pessimistic, 
when matching frictions are significant and when type 2 lenders are in short supply. 
This final point is crucial in understanding why, after the Seppenwolde default, borrowers 
decided to accept loans from pessimistic lenders. In the aftermath of 1772 there were few 
optimistic lenders. Because of matching frictions, this made it optimal for borrowers to accept 
the more conservative terms of loans offered by the more pessimistic lenders.  
II.E. Comparative statics 
Next we analyze what happens to the steady state of this model after an event like the 
Seppenwolde default. We interpret the Seppenwolde default as a change in beliefs on the part of 
the lenders. We assume that before the event the differences of beliefs between type 1 and type 2 
agents were arbitrarily small, i.e. . After the event type 1 agents, the lenders who lent 
to the consortium, become more pessimistic such that . For simplicity we assume that 
 remains the same. 
Lemma 1. Keeping all else equal and under the assumption that  
 
Remember that in equilibrium . The haircut on loans extended by type 1 
agents increases as their beliefs about the bad state become more pessimistic. Keeping the price 
constant, a fall in  will mechanically lead to a higher haircut on type 1 loans ( ). However, as 
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 falls, less credit will be extended in the aggregate and the equilibrium price will fall as well, 
counteracting (some of) the impact on haircut . The lemma establishes that the first effect 
dominates. This is intuitive; keeping all else constant the price is determined by both  and . 
There is no change in  and as long as the mass of type 2 agents is non-trivial, the elasticity of 
the price change with respect to  is smaller than 1. At the same time, haircuts on type 2 loans 
should fall as type 1 agents become more pessimistic. This works entirely through a fall in the 
price. Taken together, the model predicts that haircuts charged by different type of lenders 
should diverge after the Seppenwolde event.  
After Christmas 1772, the Seppenwolde consortium disappeared from the market. Both 
beliefs of lenders and the number of borrowers changed drastically. The following lemma 
establishes what happens in response to this second shock.  
Lemma 2. Keeping all else equal and under the assumption that   
 for . 
The Lemma predicts that as the number of borrowers (optimists) falls, haircuts on both types of 
loans decrease. This runs purely through prices – in our setting a lower equilibrium price leads to 
smaller haircuts. This means that with regard to haircut  we have two competing predictions. 
According to Lemma 1 the haircut should increase as lenders of type 1 become more pessimistic. 
According to Lemma 2  should decrease as the price falls.  Which of the two mechanisms 
dominates is ultimately an empirical question and depends on the relative size of the two 
shocks.19 However, what both Lemmas predict is that the difference between  and  should 
increase. This is a robust prediction of the model and the changing difference between the two 
types of haircuts is exactly what we measure in our data to which we turn in section IV.  
III. Data 
Data on secured lending comes from several Amsterdam notary archives. It covers the majority 
of notarized loan contracts against collateral between 1770 and 1775.20  From the same archives, 
we also collect information on notifications of margin calls (“insinuaties”), and accounts of 
settlement about the liquidation of collateral.  
                                                 
19 It is likely that the demand for English securities did not only depend on the demand of levered speculators but 
also on the demand of long term investors. In that case, a drop in N3 would have had a smaller impact on the 
equilibrium price and it is more likely that the mechanism of the first lemma dominated. 
20 The Daniel van den Brink archive is the most important; Wilson (1966) was the first scholar to use it. We have 
checked the archives of other notaries and collected the loan contracts notarized there. In addition, we have sampled 
a number of other Amsterdam notaries active in this period. This yielded no additional loan data.  
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Table 4 provides descriptive statistics about the loans. The average loan value was 29,000 
guilders, and the average value of collateral was 36,000 guilders. At the time, a skilled laborer 
could earn 1.40 guilders per day; buildings along Amsterdam’s most famous canal (the 
Heerengracht) cost around 10,000 guilders.21 Lender and borrower characteristics are taken from 
a genealogical study of Amsterdam regent families (Elias 1903). Both for lenders and borrowers, 
we treat first degree relatives as the same individual because family members were often 
involved in similar transactions with the same counterparties. In some cases (especially fathers 
and sons), families are the relevant unit of observation. In the case of borrowers, we treat 
partnerships and the persons that work within them as the same individual; we often cannot 
distinguish between transactions that are done in a person’s own name or in name of the 
partnership. 
We have information on 425 lending transactions with English stocks as collateral. Table 
5 shows how these observations are distributed over time and across exposed and non-exposed 
lenders. Most of the loan contracts we observe were signed before Christmas 1772. Lending to 
the consortium dominated, with 232 out of 362 loans taken out by the Seppenwolde group. After 
the crisis there is a strong reduction in the number of loan contracts; both exposed and unexposed 
lenders write fewer loan contracts. There is a significant exit of both lenders and borrowers. The 
rate of attrition of exposed and non-exposed lenders is approximately equal. Only one new 
lender appears after Christmas 1772. There is a similar reduction in the number of borrowers 
(partly driven by disappearance of the consortium), but there is also significant new entry. The 
percentage of loans extended to these new borrowers is approximately the same for affected and 
non-affected lenders. Finally, the table provides information about the type of collateral that was 
used. EIC stock dominates, but BoE stock is important as well. The consortium mainly borrowed 
to fund its position in EIC. Consequently, exposed lenders mainly lent on EIC as well (about 
84%). Non-exposed lenders also lent on EIC but a relatively large share was based on BoE stock 
(about 28%). After Christmas 1772 both groups of lenders converged and mainly lent on EIC.    
IV. Main Results 
In this section, we show how much haircuts changed after 1772, and how this shift arose. Our 
identification strategy relies on the fact that creditors of the Seppenwolde brothers were broadly 
similar to other lenders, that lending behavior prior to the distress event was identical, and that 
                                                 
21 De Vries and Van der Woude (1997), graph 12.1; Bisschop (1968). 
19 
 
only investors who were personally faced with possible losses on collateral changed their lending 
behavior.22 The next section examines the robustness of our findings.  
IV. A. Haircuts 
Former Seppenwolde creditors tightened their lending criteria after Christmas 1772, while other 
lenders continued as before. We calculate averages of haircuts for exposed and unexposed 
lenders, before and after Christmas 1772. Table 6 summarizes the results. Those not exposed to 
Seppenwolde lent at virtually the same rate before Christmas 1772 as the unexposed; thereafter, 
the difference rose to 7 percent. Exposed lenders raised their haircuts from 20.7 to 26.1 percent; 
unexposed ones lowered theirs (in a way that is not statistically significant) from 21.1 to 19.3 
percent. The difference-in-difference is 7.3%, equivalent to approximately a one-third rise 
relative to the initial haircuts imposed by Seppenwolde creditors before the distress episode. 
In Figure C.4 we show the full distribution of haircuts for exposed and unexposed 
lenders, before and after the crisis episode. The left panel depicts the distribution of haircuts for 
all lenders unaffected by the distress episode, before and after Christmas 1772. The modal 
haircut for both periods is 20%. In the right panel, we plot the distributions for those affected by 
the Seppenwolde episode. Here, a distinct shift to the right is clearly visible, with the mode 
increasing from 20% to 25%. After December 1772, many lenders insisted on 30% or more; 
previously, very few had lent at a rate above 30%.  
In Table 7, we analyse the effect of almost losing money in the Seppenwolde transactions 
on haircuts econometrically. We estimate the following equation 
 
where  includes year dummies. In a number of specifications, we use lender and borrower 
characteristics or lender and borrower fixed effects.  is the error term. We first pool 
observations from all types of collateral, and control for asset type separately in our regressions. 
In col 1, we report pooled OLS results with clustered standard errors (lender level, including year 
dummies). Those exposed to the consortium initially lent with smaller haircuts on average, but 
the difference is small and insignificant. Lending against collateral other than the EIC took also 
place with markedly lower haircuts. This reflects lower risks. The variable of main interest is the 
                                                 
22 Exposed lenders are defined as lenders who had to go out in the market to liquidate collateral. We drop two 
observations. In these two cases lenders rolled over existing margin loans at artificially low haircuts instead of 
liquidating the collateral. These observations belong neither to the treatment or control groups. 
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interaction of being exposed with the post-1772 dummy (coefficient β2). This shows the average 
change in haircuts after the default of the Seppenwolde syndicate for lenders who almost lost 
money. The estimated shift is upwards by 7.6 percentage points, and the coefficient is significant 
at the 1 percent level. Relative to the pre-crisis average of 21.9 percent, this is a dramatic change. 
In col 2, we add borrower and lender type dummies to account for the changing composition of 
the sample. The estimated coefficient is now 6.9 percent, somewhat smaller than before, but still 
highly significant. 
In cols 3 to 5 we include lender and borrower family/firm fixed effects. The panel is 
unbalanced and these fixed effects should control for possible changes in the composition of 
lenders and/or borrowers in the sample. In addition they should capture unobservables at the 
lender/borrower level. Table 7 reports the number of observations had we run a balanced panel. 
The inclusion of fixed effects implies a significant loss of observations. The fixed effect 
estimates should therefore be interpreted as robustness checks rather than benchmark estimates.  
One worry might be that the composition of lenders changed after Christmas 1772. 
Suppose that lenders that specialized in riskier lending had a higher likelihood of staying in the 
sample. Also suppose that these lenders were more likely to extend credit to the Seppenwolde 
consortium for 1773. Such a particular change in the composition of lenders could drive our 
results. In col 3, we use lender family fixed effects and borrower type dummies to explicitly test 
for this. The coefficient on the interaction term is stable at 6.1 percent and significant at the 10% 
level. This implies that the possible change in the composition of lenders is not responsible for 
our results.  
Did affected lenders specialize in more risky lending after Christmas 1772, perhaps 
because they acquired specialized knowledge during the Seppenwolde bankruptcy?  In col 4, we 
use borrower family/firm fixed effects and lender type dummies. The coefficient on the 
interaction term falls to 4.0 percent, but is still significant at the 10% level. This suggests that the 
possible self-selection of exposed lenders into riskier borrowers cannot account for our results. In 
the final column, we include both borrower and lender family/firm fixed effects, to capture 
changes in lending rates that come from compositional change in the pool of both debtors and 
creditors. The coefficient of the interaction effect is somewhat larger at 6.3 percent, again 
significant at the 10% level. We also examine the potential role of differential pre-crisis trends. 
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Figure 1 plots trends over time for exposed and unexposed lenders. It shows clearly that there is 
no difference before Christmas 1772; it is only thereafter that haircuts diverge substantially. 
IV.B. Interest rates and total lending 
In Appendix C, we examine if interest rates changed in response to the Seppenwolde crisis. Did 
the pricing of loans shift at the same time as the size of haircuts – and in the same differential 
manner? In Table B. 1 we use the same specifications as before, using interest rates on loan 
contracts as the dependent variable. The model in section II predicts that the market should 
balance through changes in collateral requirements, not interest rates. We examine if this is true 
in our case.  
The crucial variable for our analysis is the interaction of the post-1772 and the exposed 
dummy. There is no significant differential change in interest rates charged after 1772. In the 
benchmark estimates of columns 1 and 2 it is slightly negative, implying that exposed lenders 
charged lower interest rates after Christmas 1772. However, the coefficient is always 
economically small and never significant. This implies that interest rates were not used by 
exposed lenders to adjust for increases in perceived risk. In the appendix we also show that there 
were no significant differential pre-trends in interest rates. 
Apart from haircuts and interest rates, we also examine changes in total lending 
(Appendix C). It seems intuitive that, conditional on staying in the market, exposed lenders 
extended less credit after Christmas 1772. This could be true even after the effect of higher 
haircuts is taken into account. For example, even at higher haircuts exposed lenders may not 
have wanted to extend too much credit. Alternatively, borrowers may not have wanted to 
contract too much credit from exposed lenders since they charged relatively high haircuts. Upon 
meeting an exposed lender, they may have opted for smaller loans and waited for a better offer to 
cover the rest of their funding needs. We test this prediction in Table B. 3. Results indicate that 
exposed lenders who stayed in the market extended 30 to 50% less credit than non-exposed 
lenders. Though economically important, this effect is not tightly estimated.  
V. Extensions  
In this section, we present a number of extensions. We first show that network effects do not 
drive our results. In addition, we demonstrate that time varying lender and borrower 
characteristic cannot explain the patterns in the data, that exposure to the East India Company is 
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not responsible for the change in risk appetite, and that effects last for quite some time. We also 
show that results are not driven by the immediate aftermath of the Seppenwolde bankruptcy.  
V. A. Network effects 
In this subsection, we ask if the need to find new business partners after Christmas 1772 can 
explain the sudden increase in haircuts. If a lot of borrowing in the Amsterdam collateralized 
lending market had taken place through well-established networks, the collapse of a large group 
of borrowers would have led to a decline in “intermediation capital” (Bernanke 1992). In that 
case, lenders would have needed to screen out new borrowers, using (initially) higher haircuts as 
a result. In section 1, we showed that relationship lending was not an important feature of the 
Amsterdam loan market. Here, we document that changes in haircuts over time – for the exposed 
lenders – cannot be explained by the destruction of “relationship capital”. First, we look at the 
likelihood that lenders were matched to borrowers that they had lent to before. We investigate 
how this changed after Christmas 1772 and whether this differed between exposed and non-
exposed lenders. Results are in Table 10. They indicate that the probability of being matched 
with a repeat borrower decreased significantly after the Seppenwolde default. As the consortium 
exited the market and new borrowers entered, it became less likely that a lender was matched 
with a repeat borrower. However, this was true for both exposed and non-exposed lenders; there 
is no economically or statistically important difference between the two. These results imply that 
the relatively high haircuts charged by exposed lenders after Christmas 1772 cannot be the result 
of the destruction of relationship capital. The control group faced a similar decrease in the 
fraction of repeat lending. 
Second, we start from the assumption that lenders that are heavily invested in a particular 
client relationship will have more concentrated portfolios. We then estimate 
where  includes time effects and both borrower and lender characteristics.  is a random 
error.  captures whether lenders exposed to the default episode increased haircuts more if they 
had engaged in more relationship lending before Christmas 1772 (a higher Herfindahl index). 
Table B.4 shows that this is not the case; if anything, a higher degree of concentration before 
Christmas 1772 (more relationship lending) lead to lower haircuts. This effect is not statistically 
significant. 
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V. B. Time varying lender and borrower characteristics 
So far, we have used lender and borrower type dummies or fixed effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. However, the effect of certain characteristics may not be constant 
over time. In this section we try to test whether time varying characteristics might be able to 
explain our results. 
First take the case of lenders. Those who were exposed to the consortium may have been 
differentially affected by events after Christmas 1772. For example, if one type of lender had 
more exposure to the Seppenwolde brothers – say, those active in commerce – and their business 
was adversely affected by the turmoil of early 1773, then this could explain changes in haircuts. 
To control for this, we interact observable lender characteristics such as occupation, status or 
gender with the post-event dummy. The estimates are presented in Table 8. All estimates include 
lender and borrower type dummies (coefficients unreported). Estimated separately, we find that 
merchants lent at somewhat higher haircuts after 1772, while noblemen lent against slightly 
lower collateral values relative to asset prices; there is no significant interaction effect between 
the post-1772 dummy and the regent, gender and specialist dummies. In column 6 we estimate 
the impact of these interaction effects jointly. 23  Crucially, the coefficient on the interaction 
between exposed and the post-event dummy is virtually the same as in the benchmark estimates 
of (comparable estimates are in column 2: 6.6%) and even slightly increases in the full 
specification of col 6.  
In Table 9 (cols 1 – 4), we repeat the exercise with observable borrower characteristics. 
The intuition is similar. We already controlled for borrower type dummies or fixed effects in our 
main estimation. The limitation of this approach is that some borrowers may have been 
differently affected by the events after Christmas 1772. It is possible that exposed lenders 
specialized in different types of borrowers. By interacting observable borrower characteristics 
with the post-event dummy we can control for this factor. We distinguish between merchants, 
specialists – who both borrow and lend in this markets – and Jewish borrowers. Throughout we 
include borrower (and lender) type dummies. None of the interaction effects correlates with 
haircuts to a significant extent, except for Jewish borrowers. These on average saw lower 
                                                 
23 Because of collinearity we cannot precisely estimate the individual contributions of these additional interaction 
effects.  
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haircuts after 1772. In all specifications (cols 1-4), the coefficient for the main variable of 
interest, the interaction exposed * post-1772, is largely unaffected, ranging from 6.6% to 7.7%.  
In col 5 we take the analysis one step further by including borrower-time fixed effects. 
This specification should fully control for changes in borrower characteristics. Effectively, we 
are identifying off those borrowers who borrowed from both exposed and non-exposed lenders 
after Christmas 1772. The estimate of the interaction effect between the exposed and post-event 
dummies is statistically significant at the 1% level and the economic effect (5.6%) is very similar 
to the benchmark estimate of col (2). Admittedly, we are only using a limited number of data 
points to arrive at this estimate. Only 3 borrowers were sufficiently active after Christmas 1772 
to borrow from multiple lenders. In total, these borrowers signed 18 collateralized lending 
contracts after Christmas 1772, roughly equally split between exposed and non-exposed lenders 
(11 vs 7). This constitutes a quarter of all available observations after Christmas 1772.  
V. C. Unobservables  
It is possible that unobservables drive our results. While lenders exposed and unexposed to the 
Seppenwolde syndicate are broadly similar in many dimensions, it is generally possible to argue 
that an unobserved, underlying factor drove differences in risk appetite. To examine the possible 
empirical relevance of this issue we implement two additional tests. 
First, we study the intensive margin of adjustment. If exposed and non-exposed lenders 
differ on unobservables, it is likely that there are also unobservable differences between lenders 
who lent relatively small or large amounts to the consortium. We test this in Table 11. Results 
indicate that lenders who, either in absolute or relative terms, lent more to the consortium did not 
change haircuts differentially compared to lenders who only provided relatively little credit. The 
interaction term with absolute exposure has a positive sign, but is statistically insignificant and 
economically small. A one standard deviation increase in the absolute position with the 
consortium around Christmas 1772 only raises haircuts by 1%.  The interaction term with the 
relative exposure measure has a negative sign and is also statistically insignificant and 
economically small. A one standard deviation increase in the fraction of outstanding loans that 
were extended to the consortium decreases haircuts by 1%. 
Second, we use the Altonji et al. (2005) method. We first estimate the interaction effect 
between the Seppenwolde exposure dummy and the post-1772 dummy, without controls. Then, 
we re-estimate with controls, and examine the change in the interaction term. Assuming that 
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unobservables are correlated with observables, this bounds their possible impact. If we use the 
EIC dummy and year fixed effects in the restricted model, and all categories of possible lenders 
and borrowers in the unrestricted model, we obtain an Altonji ratio of 6.7, meaning that the 
attenuating effect of unobservables would have to be at least 6.7 times stronger than the effect of 
observable variables before our results become insignificant.24  
V. D. EIC factor 
The EIC’s stock price decline after September 1772 is the main driver behind the crisis episode 
we examine. Were changes in haircuts caused by the default of the Seppenwolde consortium, or 
if by the declining EIC stock price directly? It is possible that individuals who lent to the 
consortium overall had strong exposure to EIC stock through other portfolio holdings. Then, 
changes in haircuts could reflect managing this risk, rather than the shock of the default. 
To investigate this issue we estimate the following equation 
where  includes time effects and both borrower and lender characteristics.  is a random 
error. This equation tests whether exposed lenders in general charge higher haircuts when EIC 
prices are lower.  Results are presented in Table 12. 
Col 1 includes the interaction between the exposed dummy and the EIC stock price. The 
economic size of the coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. The average EIC price 
during 1770-1772 was 212%; in 1773-1775, it was 155%. The price decline corresponds an 
increase in haircuts by 1.9% (0.57*0.033). This is less than a third of the impact of the 
interaction effect with the post-1772 dummy (Table 7, col 2). Col 2 includes both interaction 
effects to perform a horserace: what has more explanatory power, the post-1772 dummy or 
changes in the price of EIC stock? The estimates show that the interaction effect with the post-
1772 dummy is much stronger; it increased haircuts by 6.8%. The coefficient on the interaction 
between exposed and the EIC price is now wrongly signed. Overall, these results show that EIC 
stock prices have no additional predicative power above and beyond the post-event dummy. 
V. E. Duration of effects 
How long does it take for beliefs of exposed and non-exposed lenders to converge? In Table C. 
                                                 
24 If we estimate the restricted model without the EIC and year dummies, we actually obtain a negative result – 
implying that results get stronger as we add controls.  
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1, we add time elapsed since the crisis to our regression. We run the following specification: 
where TSE is time since event, equal to zero before Christmas 1772 and equal to the time  
elapsed thereafter. The interaction between the post-1772 and exposed dummies captures the 
instantaneous differential impact on haircuts ( ). The interaction between the exposed dummy 
and “time since event” measures the degree to which haircuts converge afterwards ( ). To 
calculate the differential impact after 6 months, we can subtract  from . The estimates 
imply that within 2 years, the treatment’s impact has largely dissipated. However, since the 
number of observations falls over time, the decline in haircuts is not tightly estimated and not 
significant at standard confidence levels.  
V.F. Excluding the first post-crisis month 
When the Seppenwolde brothers went bankrupt, there was substantial uncertainty about the size 
of their position and the consequences for market prices. Several lenders received collateral after 
margin calls were not met. In addition, there was wide-spread concern in the financial sector that 
was only ebbed after the city authorities offered a lender-of-last-resort facility in the middle of 
January (see historical overview). To examine if our results simply reflect illiquidity and 
uncertainty during the immediate post-crisis period, we exclude all lending contracts signed in 
January 1773. This only marginally changes the results (Table C. 2) – we still find an increase in 
the haircut charged by exposed lenders of 4-6 percent. We do loose a number of observations 
and the fixed effects specifications become (only borderline) statistically insignificant.  
VI. Conclusion 
“One can only hope that reality will become more fashionable now [that] people are  
learning their lessons”  (De Koopman January 1773, p. 310) 
Investor heterogeneity and disagreements about asset values have important implications for 
asset pricing (Harrison and Kreps 1978; Heaton and Lucas 1995; Hong and Stein 2007). They 
may contribute to momentum, high volatility, and the formation of bubbles (Hong, Scheinkman, 
and Xiong 2006). In addition, they can have a first order impact on leverage in the economy. 
This has direct consequences for asset prices and for the amplification of shocks through the 
financial sector (Fostel and Geanakoplos 2008; He and Krishnamurthy 2013). How different 
beliefs among investors arise is less clear. Recent research suggests that personal experiences 
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may be an important source of heterogeneous beliefs (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2011; 
Malmendier and Nagel 2011; Malmendier and Nagel 2009). 
In this paper, we examine a well-identified case of large and long-lasting changes in the  
behavior of major market participants. We analyze lenders who financed the equity positions of 
speculators in 18th century Amsterdam. When an important syndicate of investors went bankrupt, 
some of these lenders were at risk of losing money – margin calls went unanswered, and the 
lenders were assigned collateral. Therefore, this episode could have spelled heavy losses. In 
actual fact, the “treated” lenders recovered all of the principal and interest owed. In a difference-
in-difference setting, we show that nonetheless, those who almost lost money sharply increased 
their collateral requirements in all future transactions -- despite the fact that they actually 
sustained no losses. Lenders unaffected by the bankruptcy continued to lend as before. Overall 
leverage was reduced. 
Modern financial markets do not function in exactly the same fashion as the 18th century 
Amsterdam stock market, but there are important similarities. Collateralized lending continues to 
be a key feature of securities markets, and changes in leverage have potentially important 
consequences for market stability. Search-and-matching continues to be important – repo 
contracts are negotiated in OTC markets, for example. One important difference limits 
comparisons with the present, but aids identification: financial intermediation played no role in 
18th century Amsterdam, whereas many of today’s key players are intermediaries. The fact that 
lending was strongly pro-cyclical in the past, even without incentive distortions due to agency 
problems, strongly suggests that changes to personal risk-taking can drive changes in leverage.  
We cannot determine exactly what caused the differential change in behavior. The fact 
that East India stock was more volatile – and returns more often negative – after 1771 was public 
information. So was the ill fortune of the Seppenwolde syndicate. Nonetheless, the only investors 
who changed their behavior were the ones who came close to losing part of their capital. One 
interpretation is that lenders who were nearly “burnt” raised haircuts because the risk of losses 
was more salient. 25 Alternatively, those exposed to the Seppenwolde consortium could have 
learnt about their own ability to select good investors, i.e. those who could meet margin calls 
when asset values declined. Both channels would in turn have lead Seppenwolde lenders to 
update their beliefs about the risks of collateralized lending to a much greater extent than 
                                                 
25 For an analysis of the effects of salience on risk-taking, cf. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010).  
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unexposed lenders. Strikingly, haircuts for exposed and non-exposed lenders converge only 
slowly in the years after the Seppenwolde bankruptcy. Our results strongly suggest that 
individual risk taking can change substantially as a result of personal experience, even without 
actual changes to wealth – and that such changes do not only arise among retail investors 
(Malmendier and Nagel 2011), but among major market participants. 
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Figure and Tables  
 
Figure 1: Haircuts over time (half-yearly averages) 
 
This figure presents the average haircuts demanded by exposed and non-exposed lenders for 
every quarter between 1770h1 and 1775h1 (when our data ends). Averages are weighed by 
the size of the loan transactions (nominal or face value of collateral).  
 
Figure 2: The timing of collateralized loans extended by Denis Adries Roest, 1770-1772 
Panel (A) – the November (May) cycle Panel (B) – the June (December) cycle 
  
This figure illustrates the importance of timing in determining matches between lenders and borrowers with the 
example of lender Denis Adrien Roest. Loan contracts were signed for 6 (or 12) months and were often silently 
renewed with another 6 (or 12) months. Roest extended his loans either in the beginning of May/November or 
June/December. When loans were repaid after a multiple of 6 months, funds became available for new borrowers.  
The vertical axis indicates borrowing by different borrowers; the width of the bars indicates the size of the 
collateral behind a loan (in nominal or face value). The horizontal axis plots time and indicates when loans were 
originally extended and renewed. 
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Figure 3: Lender and borrower network – 1770-75 
 
 
 
 Figure 4: EIC stock price in Amsterdam between 1723 and 1793 
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Figure 5: The Crisis after Christmas 1772 
 
Prices EIC stock in Amsterdam and London; margin calls lenders to consortium; subsequent sell-off 
collateral by lenders. The black vertical line indicates Christmas 1772. 
 
Table 1: Lender, borrower and loan characteristics: exposed vs non-exposed 
  Exposed Non-exposed t-stat 
  Mean N Mean N Linear Logit Probit 
Le
nd
er
s  % Regent 28.0% 132 40.0% 40 1.44 1.26 1.25 
% Noble 29.4% 136 31.0% 42 0.19 0.73 0.72 
% Female 19.9% 136 21.4% 42 0.22 0.28 0.28 
% Specialist 3.7% 136 2.4% 42 -0.41 -0.66 -0.69 
B
or
ro
w
er
s  
% Merchant 
 
96.4% 
 
55 
 
88.0% 
 
75 
 
1.70 
 
1.60 
 
1.68 
% Jew 
%Specialist 
40% 
12.7% 
55 
55 
33.3% 
14.7% 
75 
75 
0.77 
0.31 
0.78 
0.32 
0.78 
0.32 
Lo
an
s Lending volume (£ 000’s) 2.909 141 2.739 110 0.35   
EIC 
Interest rate 
0.87 
3.77 
141 
141 
0.58 
3.54 
110 
108 
5.77 
7.4 
4.9 5.07 
Panel 1: general characteristics of lenders who did or did not lend to the Seppenwolde consortium (exposed vs non-
exposed). E.g. 50.4% of lenders who lent to the consortium were merchants. Because of overlapping categories the 
percentages do not sum up to 100. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events 
of Christmas 1772. 
Merchant – active in commercial activities; regent – member of (local) government or the judiciary; specialist – 
lender who also borrows.  
Panel 2: general characteristics of the borrowers who obtained loans from exposed or non-exposed lenders 
(excluding borrower from the Seppenwolde consortium). Merchant – active in commercial activities.  
Panel 3: general characteristics of the loans extended by exposed and non-exposed. Lending volume – measured by 
the nominal value of the collateral. EIC – fraction of loans collateralized with EIC stock.  
Data refers to 1770-1773 only. T-statistics refer to simple t-tests on the equality of means of the two different sub-
samples and t-statistics calculated in a Logit and Probit setup.    
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Table 2: Positions of the Seppenwolde syndicate, Christmas 1772 
Member of the Syndicate Position (nominal) 
  EIC BoE 
Hermanus van Seppenwolde £63,600 £49,500 
Johannes van Seppenwolde £69,600 £17,000 
Clifford & Chevalier £44,500 0 
Pieter van Peene £2,000 £4,000 
Total £179,700 £70,500 
Total outstanding £3,194,080 £10,780,000 
% syndicate in total outstanding 5.63% 0.65% 
Av. monthly turnover  (1770-1772) £196,967 ? 
% syndicate in av. monthly turnover   91.23% ? 
Positions calculated at the end of 1772. Average monthly turnover is based on the turnover in the 
capital books of the respective companies. Actual market turnover would have been higher if 
transactions were netted out before mutations in the capital books were made.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, EIC stock returns over 6 month periods (overlapping) 
Sample Prior to distress Distress period Full 
 1723-1772* 1770-73** 1723-1794 
Mean 0.0051 -0.034 0.0028 
Median 0.0068 -0.019 0.0053 
σ 0.089 0.108 0.089 
Skewness 0.248 -0.49 -0.07 
Maximum loss -0.256 -0.358 -0.358 
% of observations with 
loss>0.2 
0.011 0.075 0.022 
* first half  ** first week of 1773 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics - loan contracts 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Real value of collateral guilders) 418 36,271 27,734 4,782 238,058 
Nominal (face) value of 
collateral (£) 
420 1,910 1,608 300 15,000 
Loan value (guilders) 422 28,969 23,244 2,200 210,000 
Haircut 418 0.205 0.059 0.080 0.550 
Interest rate (in %) 420 3.63 0.30 2.50 4.00 
Non-EIC (BoE, SSC, 3% 
annuities) 
405 0.102 0.042 -0.055 0.310 
      
35 
 
Table 5: Number of loans, lenders and borrowers, and collateral before/after Christmas 1772 
Panel (A): Number of loan contracts by period 
 From exposed Loans consortium 
 yes No yes no 
Before Xmas 1772 217 145 232 130 
After Xmas 1772 41 15 . 56 
     
Panel (B): Number of lenders and borrowers by period 
 # of lenders; exposed # of borrowers; from exposed 
 yes no yes no 
Before Xmas 1772 77 68 32 36 
After Xmas 1772 17 9 20 11 
# new lenders/borrowers 
after Xmas 1772 
. 1 12 4 
% loans accounted for by 
new lenders/borrowers 
. 11% 44% 40% 
     
Panel (C): Types of collateral used by period  
 EIC BoE Other 
 Lenders exposed Lenders exposed Lenders exposed 
 yes no Yes no yes no 
Before Xmas 1772 84% 55% 14% 38% 2% 7% 
After Xmas 1772 83% 88% 0% 6% 17% 6% 
The table presents descriptive statistics before and after Christmas 1772. Panel (A) presents the number of new loans 
that were extended, differentiated by whether loans were extended by lenders who were exposed to the consortium 
around Christmas 1772 or by whether loans were taken up by the Seppenwolde consortium. Exposed lenders are 
those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the default. Some loans taken up by the consortium were repaid 
before Christmas 1772. This explains why the total number of consortium loans is larger than the number of loans 
extended by exposed lenders. Panel (B) lists the number of lenders and borrowers. Lenders are differentiated by 
whether they were exposed or not. Borrowers are differentiated by whether they borrowed from exposed lenders yes 
or no. The panel also lists the number of new lenders and borrowers that entered the market after Christmas 1772. 
New borrowers are differentiated by whether they borrow from exposed or non-exposed lenders. We also calculate 
the percentage of total lending extended by new lenders / taken up by new borrowers. Total lending is measured in 
nominal or face value of the collateral. Panel (C) presents the type of collateral that was used in the loan transactions, 
again differentiated by whether lenders were exposed yes or no. EIC is East India Company, BoE is Bank of 
England, Other includes South Sea Company and a number of government securities.  
 
 
Table 6: Simple difference-in-difference estimate –  EIC stock only 
  Before Christmas 1772 After Christmas 1772 
∆ 
Not exposed 0.211 0.193 -0.018 
Exposed 0.207 0.261 0.054*** 
  -0.004 0.069*** 0.072*** 
Average haircuts on EIC stock, differentiated by exposed and non-exposed lenders, before and after Christmas 
1772. Haircuts are calculated as the fraction of the collateral value that is not financed with a loan. Exposed lenders 
are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 1772. Observations refer to new 
contracts. Averages are weighed by the nominal (face) value of the collateral. The simple diff-in-diff estimate is in 
bold in the lower right corner. *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
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 Table 7: Haircut change – benchmark estimates 
 
(1) 
Pooled OLS 
(2) 
Pooled 
OLS 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
 
(5) 
FE 
Exposed -0.005 -0.003 0.017 -0.000 0.028 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013)** 
Exposed * Post 1772 0.076 0.066 0.061 0.040 0.063 
 (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.036)* (0.024)* (0.036)* 
non-EIC -0.059 -0.056 -0.049 -0.052 -0.047 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)*** (0.014)*** 
Lender merchant  0.007  0.004  
  (0.007)  (0.007)  
Lender regent  -0.005  -0.004  
  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Lender noble  0.003  0.004  
  (0.005)  (0.006)  
Lender female  -0.007  -0.003  
  (0.007)  (0.007)  
Lender specialist  -0.012  -0.007  
  (0.007)*  (0.009)  
Borrower merchant  -0.039 -0.042   
  (0.016)** (0.022)*   
Borrower specialist  -0.004 -0.018   
  (0.011) (0.017)   
Borrower Jewish  0.050 0.047   
  (0.011)*** (0.015)***   
Constant 0.219 0.245 0.235 0.211 0.174 
 (0.006)*** (0.017)*** (0.026)*** (0.012)*** (0.036)*** 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender FE N N Y N Y 
Borrower FE N N N Y Y 
N 418 387 418 387 418 
N (if balanced)   166 77 33 
# lenders 177 152 177 152 177 
# borrowers 72 70 72 70 72 
R2 0.334 0.440 0.632 0.659 0.802 
Regression estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new contracts and are weighted by the nominal 
(face) value of the collateral. Haircuts are calculated as the fraction of the collateral value that is not financed with a 
loan. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 1772. The 
interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies captures the diff-in-diff effect. Lender and borrower 
fixed effects refer to fixed effects on the family/firm level. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) are 
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Haircuts and lender characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposed -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Exposed * Post 1772 0.062 0.068 0.062 0.064 0.065 0.061 
 (0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.021)*** 
non-EIC -0.055 -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
Merchant * Post 1772 0.033     0.022 
 (0.019)*     (0.063) 
Regent * Post 1772  -0.015    0.008 
  (0.017)    (0.056) 
Noble * Post 1772   -0.040   -0.029 
   (0.019)**   (0.023) 
Female * Post 1772    -0.026  -0.002 
    (0.029)  (0.053) 
Specialist* Post1772     0.005 -0.005 
     (0.047) (0.041) 
Constant 0.241 0.243 0.239 0.244 0.245 0.239 
 (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender & borrower  
observables 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 387 387 387 387 387 387 
R2 0.448 0.442 0.452 0.443 0.440 0.453 
# lenders 152 152 152 152 152 152 
Pooled OLS estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new contracts and are weighted by the 
nominal (face) value of the collateral. Haircuts are calculated as the fraction of the collateral value that is not 
financed with a loan. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 
1772. The interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies captures the diff-in-diff effect. Lender and 
borrower observables are as in Table 6. Merchant – active in commerce; regent – member of (local) government or 
judiciary; specialist – lenders also active as borrower. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) are 
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 9: Haircuts and borrower characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Exposed -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Exposed * Post 1772 0.067 0.066 0.076 0.077 0.056 
 (0.023)*** (0.024)*** (0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.024)** 
non-EIC -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 -0.057 -0.051 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** 
Merchant * Post 1772 0.002   0.038  
 (0.048)   (0.050)  
Specialist * Post 1772  -0.038  -0.032  
  (0.024)  (0.022)  
Jewish * Post 1772   -0.056 -0.056  
   (0.025)** (0.025)**  
Constant 0.245 0.241 0.236 0.242 0.207 
 (0.016)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.015)*** (0.012)*** 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender & borrower 
observables 
Y Y Y Y  
Borrower-time FE N N N N Y 
N 387 387 387 387 387 
R2 0.440 0.447 0.458 0.464 0.691 
# groups (borrowers) 70 70 70 70 70 
 
 
Table 10: Probability of lender matched to a repeat borrower 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS Logit Logit Probit Probit 
Post 1772 -0.211 -0.196 -0.211 -0.209 -0.211 -0.207 
 (0.050)*** (0.108)* (0.050)*** (0.110)* (0.050)*** (0.104)** 
Exposed  0.026  0.020  0.021 
  (0.109)  (0.086)  (0.091) 
Exposed * Post   -0.018  -0.002  -0.006 
1772  (0.122)  (0.196)  (0.173) 
N 224 224 224 224 224 224 
R2 0.050 0.050     
Dependent variable: is a lender matched to a repeat borrower (one (s)he has been matched to before) 0: no; 1: yes. 
Unit of observation: new loan contracts. To minimize measurement error of the repeat borrower variable, 
transactions after Jan 1, 1772 only. Post 1772 is a dummy for contracts signed after Christmas 1772. Exposed is a 
dummy for lenders who were exposed to the Seppenwolde bankruptcy. We report marginal effects. Estimates should 
be interpreted as the change in the probability of being matched with a repeat borrower in response to a change in 
the dummy variables from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 11: Intensive margin 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
Exposed -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Exposed * Post 1772 0.066 0.052 0.077 
 (0.023)*** (0.028)* (0.039)** 
non-EIC -0.056 -0.056 -0.056 
 (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** 
Absolute position with 
consortium (£ 000s) 
 -0.000  
 (0.000)  
* Post 1772  0.002  
  (0.003)  
Relative position with 
consortium (fraction) 
  -0.001 
  (0.011) 
* Post 1772   -0.026 
   (0.038) 
Constant 0.245 0.247 0.246 
 (0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Lender observables Y Y Y 
Borrower observables Y Y Y 
N 387 387 384 
R2 0.440 0.443 0.442 
Regression estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new contracts and are weighted by the nominal 
(face) value of the collateral. Haircuts are calculated as the fraction of the collateral value that is not financed with a 
loan. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 1772. The 
interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies captures the extensive margin of adjustment. The 
“absolute position with the consortium” measures the total amount of the collateral the consortium had pledged with 
a specific lender around Christmas 1772 (in (£ 000s nominal or face value). The “relative position with the 
consortium” divides this measure by the total amount of collateral that was pledged with a specific lender before 
Christmas 1772. The interactions with the post 1772 dummy capture the intensive margin of adjustment. We do not 
measure this with a triple interaction because the position with the consortium for non-exposed lenders is always 0. 
Standard errors for the absolute and relative position measures are 5.26 and 0.39 respectively. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at the lender level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 12: EIC factor 
 (1) (2) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
Exposed 0.003 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
Exposed * EIC price -0.033 0.047 
 (0.030) (0.038) 
EIC price 0.049 -0.015 
 (0.029)* (0.035) 
Exposed * Post 1772  0.068 
  (0.035)* 
Constant 0.245 0.252 
 (0.022)*** (0.023)*** 
Year dummies Y Y 
Lender observables Y Y 
N 288 288 
R2 0.320 0.332 
# lenders  127 127 
Pooled OLS regression estimates for EIC stock only. Observations refer to new contracts and are weighted by the 
nominal (face) value of the collateral. Haircuts are calculated as the fraction of the collateral value that is not 
financed with a loan. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 
1772. EIC prices are in fractions of the nominal (face) value. Average price before Christmas 1772 2.12, after 
Christmas 1772 1.55. The estimates in col 1 indicate that such a price fall causes haircuts demanded by exposed to 
increase by 0.019 (0.57*0.033). The interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies in col 2 captures 
the benchmark diff-in-diff effect. Lender observables are as in table 6. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender 
level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
 
Appendix A: Sample contract – original and English translation (SAA 10,602, F. 1309) 
Heden den 2e November 1772 compareerde 
voor mij Daniel van den Brink Openbaar 
Notaris binnen Amsterdam de heer Raphael 
de Abraham Mendes da Costa, voor en in de 
naam van zijn Compagnie luidende 
Abraham de Raphael Mendes da Costa & 
Co, Kooplieden binnen deeze stadt  
 
Today, November 2, 1772 appeared 
before me, Daniel van den Brink, Public 
Notary in the City of Amsterdam, mr. 
Raphael de Abraham Mendes da Costa, 
for and in the name of his company called 
Abraham de Raphael Mendes da Costa & 
Co, merchants in this town (hereafter: “the 
party present”). 
 
en bekende bij deeze wel en deugdelijk 
schuldig te wezen aan de Heer Ananias 
Willink, meede Coopman alhier de somma 
van 24.000 guldens bankgeld spruytende uyt 
hoofden en ter saake van sodanige somma 
als de selve den 22e Oktober laatstleden aan 
syn comp[arants] voorn[oemde] Compagnie 
heeft afgeschreven, […] en welke somma 
van f. 24.000 Bankgeld hij Comparant in de 
naam van zijn voorn[oemde] compagnie 
aanneemt  
 
And declared to be indebted to mr. 
Ananias Willink, also merchant in this city 
for the sum of 24,000 guilders banco, 
originating from and relating to a 
withdrawal of such sum on October 22 
last in favor of the present party’s said 
company, and the present party accepting 
that sum of 24,000 guilders banco in the 
name of said company. 
 
en belooft aan voorn[oemde] Heer Ananias 
Willink of zijn Co[mpagnies] rechthebbende 
kosten schadeloos alhier weeder te zullen 
restitueren en voldoen binnen de tijdt van 
ses maanden te reekenen van den 6 Oktober 
deeses jaars met den Interest van dien 
tegens vier percent ’t jaar en bij prolongatie 
gelijke interest  
 
And promises to said mr Ananias Willink, 
or his company’s legal representative, to 
return this sum (including any costs 
incurred), within the time of six months, 
counting from October 6 this year, with 
the interest of 4% annual, and in case of 
prolongation the same interest. 
 
en zulks tot de volle en effectueele 
betaalinge toe tog de interessen te betaalen 
ieder 6 maanden des zo zal bij opeischinge 
of aflossinge den een den ander ses weeken 
voor de vervaltijd waarschouwent  
 
And [promises] to pay the full and 
effective payment of the interest every six 
months 
In case that the contract is not prolonged 
he will be notified 6 weeks in advance. 
 
tot nakominge deezes verbind hij comparant 
zijn en zijn gemelde Compagnons persoon 
en goederen als na rechten en specialijk 
sodanige vijftienhonderd ponden sterling 
capitaal actien in de d’Oost Indische 
Compagnie van Engeland als tot London 
voor reekening van zijn comparants 
To honor this agreement, the present party 
pledges his own body and goods and 
especially 1500 Pounds Sterling capital in 
the stocks of the English East India 
Company, which have been transferred in 
London from the account of the present 
party’s company to the account of said mr. 
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gemelde compagnie als pand ter minnen op 
de naam en reekening van gemelde H[eer] 
Ananias Willink zijn getransporteerd […] 
 
Ananias Willink as collateral.  
[…] 
 
en zulks meede een somma van f. 1500 
indien deselve actien mogten komen te 
daalen op 180% en zo vervolgens van 10 tot 
10 % om bij aflossinge en voldoeninge van 
gemelde capitaale somma gerescontreerd en 
geluiqideerd te werden, zullende de 
interessen van zodaanige restitutie kon te 
resteeren van dien dag af dat dezelve 
restitutie geschied is  
 
And he also [promises] to transfer an 
amount of 1500 guilders banco if the price 
of said stock were to fall below 180% and 
similarly with every additional fall of 
10%. Interest payments associated with 
these sums of money will be calculated 
until the moment the money is effectively 
transferred. 
 
en hy comparant belooft meede in de naam 
van zyn gemelde Compagnie te zullen goed 
doen de provisie en onkosten die by ’t 
transporteren van dezelve Actien aan zijn 
compagnie zullen komen te vallen welk 
transport by aflossinge zal met ten 
geschieden door de correspondenten van 
zijn comparants gemelde Compagnie.  
 
And he, the party present, promises in the 
name of his said Company to pay for the 
fees and other costs associated with 
transferring the stock to his Company the 
moment the loan is repaid, which will be 
arranged by the correspondents of the 
present party’s said company 
 
Voorts verklaarde hy Comparant dezelve 
Heer Anianas Willink specialijk te 
authoriseeren en consititueeren ommeindien 
zijn comparants gemelde compagnie in 
gebreken mogt komen te blijven de 
voorsz[egde] capitaale somma van f. 24000 
bankgeld en interessen promptelijk te 
betaalen en voldoen ofte […] en meede zo 
wanneer bij vermindering der waarde van 
voornoemde Actien zijn comparants 
gemelde Compagnie op de eerste 
aanzegginge ’t surplus niet kwam te voldoen 
dezelve actien door een makelaar alhier ofte 
tot London te mogen verkopen omme daar 
uit te vinden ’t geene syn Ed[eles] uit kragte 
deezes zal zijn Competeerende ’t geene hy 
Comparant in de naam van zyn voornoemde 
Compagnie belooft voor goed vast en van 
waarde te houden en zoo wanneer dezelve 
minder mogten renderen zoo belooft hij 
comparant ’t mindere aan zijn Ed[elste] 
zullen opleggen en voldoen waar tegens 
gemelde Heer Ananias Willink als meerdere 
Furthermore, the present party declares 
that, in case the present party’s company 
defaults on the obligation to repay said 
sum of 24,000 guilders banco and 
associated interest payments in a timely 
fashion, or when he fails (due to the fall in 
value of said stocks) to provide additional 
surplus after a first instigation, he 
authorizes mr. Ananias Willink especially 
to have the said stock sold through an 
official broker, either here or in London, 
and to retrieve from the proceeds the 
amount of money he is entitled according 
to this agreement with the present party’s 
company.  
In case the sale yields less than the full 
amount, the present party promises to 
make up the difference. In case it yields 
more, mr. Ananias Willink will remit the 
resulting surplus.  
The party present declares that he has 
received a counter-deed in reference to 
said stock. 
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aan zijn comparants gemelde Compagnie 
zal goed doen en hij Comparant bekende 
van syn Ed[ele] wegens voorsz[egde] actien 
een renvers[aal] te hebben ontvangen 
 
 
Actum Amsterdam, 2 November 1772 Signed in Amsterdam, November 2, 1772 
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Appendix B:  Interest rates, total lending and concentration of lending 
Interest rates 
The model predicts that interest rates should not change differentially after the Seppenwolde 
default. By giving all bargaining power to the borrower, interest rates will always equal the risk 
free rate, independent of the type of match. In this subsection we do two things. First, we argue 
that a richer model that allocates some bargaining power to the lenders has similar predictions. 
Second, we show that the empirical findings are consistent with the market balancing through 
haircuts rather than interest rates. 
What pins down interest rates in the model developed in section II when we allocate 
(some) bargaining power to the lender? Do interest rates on loans of types 1 and 2 change 
differentially? The interest rate predictions that follow from such an extended model are 
ambiguous. After being matched, agents bargain over the match-specific surplus. This is defined 
as  and measures the gains to a type 3 agent from accepting a loan of type  
relative to waiting for another match in the future. Suppose that agents engage in Nash 
bargaining and always get a fixed fraction of the surplus. Transfers between borrowers and 
lenders take place through interest payments. The interest rate therefore equals the risk free rate 
(which is normalized to zero) plus the transfer from borrower to lender divided by the size of the 
loan. Consider the case where the beliefs of type 1 and 2 agents are initially similar and focus on 
the impact of a drop in . In that case, type 1 lenders become less attractive and the match 
specific surplus will be lower than for a type 2 lender, i.e. . Type 1 and 2 
lenders will always get the same fraction of the match-specific surplus, but the absolute value of 
their share is smaller for type 1 agents. This would suggest that type 1 borrowers charge lower 
interest rates. However, the size of the loan they extend is also smaller. Both numerator and 
denominator decrease. The net effect is small and the sign is ambiguous (it depends on the exact 
parameter values). 
We next explore the empirical evidence. Figure B. 1 shows the development of interest 
rates over time. The figure shows that the interest rates that are charged by exposed and non-
exposed lenders track each other very closely, both before and after Christmas 1772. This is 
confirmed by figure Figure B. 2 that presents the distributions of interest rates that are charged 
by exposed and non-exposed. The figure shows a shift to lower interest rates after Christmas 
1772 that occurs for both groups of lenders. 
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We test this econometrically in Table B. 1. The table confirms that there is no differential 
change in the interest rate (see discussion in the main text). The table further shows that non-EIC 
securities attracted lower interest rates, but the difference is small – between 8 and 10 basis 
points. In a number of specifications we also find that lenders exposed to the syndicate initially 
charged somewhat higher interest rates both before and after the event. In col (1), the effect is 
statistically significant but economically small – the estimated coefficient implies a difference of 
8 basis points. When we control for lender and borrower type dummies the coefficient falls to 
about 5 basis points and becomes statistically insignificant. 
 
Total lending 
Did lending volume per lender change as a result of the Seppenwolde episode? Table B. 3 
examines total lending volume per lender. We analyze both total lending (cols 1 – 3) and lending 
excluding loans made to the Seppenwolde consortium (all before Christmas 1772) (cols 4 – 6). 
Those who were exposed lent more than the rest before the crisis, on average. Lending against 
assets other than the EIC was also associated with higher lending volume.  
Most importantly, the statistical results suggest that those affected by the Seppenwolde 
crisis differentially reduced their lending thereafter. Especially in the fixed effect estimate of col 
3, this increase seems to have been by a quantitatively considerable margin. When we exclude 
loans made to the Seppenwolde consortium, the treatment effect is reduced but is still negative. 
Depending on the specification, exposed lenders lent 30 to 50% less after Christmas 1773. Even 
though these effects are economically important, none of them is actually statistically significant.  
 
Concentration of lending 
To test if random matching of lenders and borrowers can explain the nature of lending in our 
sample, we calculate the Herfindahl index for every lender during the pre-crisis period: 
 
where  is the share of lending by lender � to an individual borrower �. If lenders repeatedly 
lent to the same borrower, to the exclusion of other investors, we would expect a high Herfindahl 
index. The left panel of Figure B. 3 presents the actual distribution of these Herfindahl indices 
for all lenders in ours sample. Many lenders only entered into a single transaction; these are 
46 
 
highlighted for the observations where the Herfindahl index equals 1. 26  The distribution is 
discontinuous, with zero weight between 0.68 and 1. This is the result of the way a Herfindahl 
index is constructed and the fact that most lenders only do a few transactions.  
To compare the actual distribution with one arising by chance, we randomly pick a lender 
from our set of actual lenders. We determine how many new loan contracts he or she entered into 
before Christmas 1772, and then randomly draw a corresponding number of counterparties 
(taking into account that some borrowers are more active than others). Finally, we calculate the 
resulting Herfindahl index, and repeat the exercise 10,000 times. As the figure demonstrates, the 
two distributions are nearly identical. Both the Pearson X2 and the log likelihood test for the 
equality of distributions fail to reject.27  
We use the Herfindahl indices to test whether the (possible) destruction of existing credit 
networks after the Seppenwolde bankruptcy might explain our empirical findings. The idea is 
that lenders who lost their network would have been forced to lend to new borrowers. Since 
these individuals were relatively unknown, they would have initially charged higher haircuts. We 
start from the assumption that lenders that are heavily invested in a particular client relationship 
will have more concentrated portfolios. We then estimate the following equation 
where  includes time effects and both borrower and lender characteristics.  is a random 
error.  captures whether lenders increased haircuts more if they had engaged in more 
relationship lending before Christmas 1772 (a higher Herfindahl index). Table B. 4 (col 1) shows 
that this is not the case; if anything a higher degree of concentration before Christmas 1772 
(more relationship lending) leads to lower haircuts. This effect is not statistically significant 
though.  
In col 2 we include a triple interaction effect between the Herfindahl index, the post-1772 
dummy and the exposed dummy. This captures whether exposed lenders who had a more 
concentrated lending portfolio changed haircuts more aggressively after Christmas 1772. The 
idea is that exposed lenders with a relatively concentrated loan portfolio would have faced a 
larger disruption of their network. The triple interaction effect is insignificant and negative, 
                                                 
26 The y-axes are aligned to reflect equal fractions. Grey bars reflect lenders who entered into at least 2 transactions. 
The white bars indicated lenders who only lent out once. 
27 P-values 0.43 and 0.505. 
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suggesting that, if anything, exposed lenders with a more concentrated loan portfolio charged 
lower haircuts after the Seppenwolde default. 
 
Figure B. 1: Interest rates over time (half-yearly averages) 
 
This figure presents the average interest rates demanded by exposed and non-exposed 
lenders for every quarter between 1770h1 and 1775h1 (when our data ends). Averages are 
weighed by the size of the loan transactions (nominal or face value of collateral). 
 
Figure B. 2: Interest rates before and after Christmas 1772 
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Figure B. 3: Herfindahl indices – actual vs simulated 
 
For each lender we calculate the Herfindahl index of its lending before Christmas 1772. In addition, 
we construct a random distribution of Herfindahl indices. We randomly pick a lender from our set of 
lenders; we determine how many (x) new loan contracts it entered into before Christmas 1772; we 
randomly draw x counterparties (taking into account that some borrowers are more active than 
others); and we calculate the resulting Herfindahl index. We do this 10,000 times. The y-axes are 
aligned to reflect equal fractions. Grey bars reflect lenders who entered into at least 2 transactions. 
The white bars indicated lenders who only lent out once. 
Tests on the equality of the distributions: 
 Test statistic pvalue 
Pearson's X2 83.8 0.435 
Log likelihood ratio     37.9 0.505 
Obs. (Unique values) 178 (84)  
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Table B. 1: Interest rates – benchmark estimates 
 
(1) 
Pooled OLS 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
FE 
Exposed 0.072 0.048 -0.116 0.074 -0.152 
 (0.036)** (0.034) (0.048)** (0.041)* (0.057)*** 
Exposed * Post 1772 -0.049 -0.034 -0.077 0.035 0.073 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.130) (0.113) (0.219) 
non-EIC -0.078 -0.093 -0.084 -0.104 -0.078 
 (0.036)** (0.034)*** (0.050)* (0.049)** (0.053) 
Lender merchant  0.126  0.090  
  (0.057)**  (0.063)  
Lender regent  -0.016  -0.017  
  (0.044)  (0.050)  
Lender noble  0.024  0.027  
  (0.045)  (0.047)  
Lender female  0.027  0.001  
  (0.049)  (0.043)  
Lender specialist  -0.023  -0.024  
  (0.032)  (0.041)  
Borrower merchant  -0.141 -0.060   
  (0.084)* (0.088)   
Borrower specialist  -0.080 -0.096   
  (0.043)* (0.066)   
Borrower Jewish  0.018 -0.016   
  (0.035) (0.046)   
Constant 3.527 3.637 3.739 3.559 3.879 
 (0.036)*** (0.096)*** (0.102)*** (0.071)*** (0.177)*** 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender FE N N Y N Y 
Borrower FE N N N Y Y 
N 418 386 418 386 418 
N (if balanced panel)   166 77 33 
# lenders 177 152 177 152 177 
# borrowers 72 70 72 70 72 
R2 0.511 0.564 0.744 0.699 0.836 
Regression estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new contracts and are weighted by the nominal 
(face) value of the collateral. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of 
Christmas 1772. The interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies captures the diff-in-diff effect. 
Lender and borrower fixed effects refer to fixed effects on the family/firm level. Robust standard errors (clustered at 
the lender level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B. 2: Interest rates – Winsorized dependent variable  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
Exposed 0.064 0.042 -0.111 0.060 -0.162 
 (0.035)* (0.033) (0.045)** (0.041) (0.053)*** 
      
Exposed * Post 1772 -0.019 -0.008 -0.059 0.026 0.070 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.086) (0.080) (0.165) 
      
non-EIC -0.072 -0.087 -0.076 -0.104 -0.076 
 (0.036)** (0.033)** (0.045)* (0.049)** (0.054) 
      
Constant 3.534 3.617 3.690 3.583 3.620 
 (0.033)*** (0.092)*** (0.094)*** (0.070)*** (0.145)*** 
R2 0.464 0.515 0.736 0.659 0.840 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender FE N N Y N Y 
Borrower FE N N N Y Y 
Lender observables N Y  Y  
Borrower observables N Y Y   
N 418 386 418 386 418 
N (if balanced panel)   166 77 33 
# lenders 177 152 177 152 177 
# borrowers 72 70 72 70 72 
Regression estimates for all English securities. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after 
the events of Christmas 1772. The interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies captures the diff-in-
diff effect. Panel (A): observations are uniformly weighted. Panel (B): observations are weighted by the nominal 
(face) value of the collateral; the top and bottom 5% of the distribution are Winsorized. Robust standard errors 
(clustered at the lender level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B. 3: Total lending 
 Including Van Seppenwolde Excluding Van Seppenwolde 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE 
Exposed 1.911 2.144 2.489 1.433 1.783 0.188 
 (0.935)** (1.166)* (2.054) (0.923) (1.212) (2.375) 
       
Post 1772 0.326 0.175 -0.104 0.742 0.764 0.129 
 (0.487) (0.610) (1.713) (0.402)* (0.517) (2.275) 
       
Exposed * 
Post 1772 
-1.186 -1.465 -3.648 -0.749 -1.232 -1.640 
 (0.913) (1.163) (3.341) (0.988) (1.081) (2.447) 
       
non-EIC 3.337 3.499 2.782 2.243 1.832 1.720 
 (1.346)** (1.700)** (3.612) (0.895)** (0.954)* (3.345) 
       
Constant 2.190 3.050 2.287 1.884 4.147 2.864 
 (0.462)*** (1.405)** (1.492) (0.335)*** (1.518)*** (1.272)** 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender 
observables 
N Y  N Y  
Lender FE N N Y N N Y 
N 202 175 202 128 113 128 
N (if balanced 
panel) 
  50   30 
R2 0.040 0.080 0.880 0.050 0.150 0.955 
# lenders 177 152 177 113 99 113 
Regression estimates for total lending at the lender level on the collateral of all English securities. Total lending is 
calculated before and after Christmas 1772; in £000s of nominal (face) value. Exposed lenders are those who were 
forced to liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 1772. The interaction between the post-1772 and the 
exposed dummies captures the diff-in-diff effect. Lender observables are as in Table 6. Lender fixed effects refer to 
fixed effects on the family level. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) are reported in parentheses. * 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Table B. 4: Haircuts and concentration lending before Christmas 1772 
 (1) (2) 
Exposed -0.002 0.022 
 (0.005) (0.012)* 
Exposed * Post 1772 0.056 0.075 
 (0.028)** (0.056) 
non-EIC -0.056 -0.055 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
Herfindahl (pre-event)  0.006 0.028 
 (0.008) (0.014)** 
Herfindahl (pre-event) * Post 1772 -0.030 -0.011 
 (0.036) (0.070) 
Herfindahl (pre-event) * Exposed  -0.037 
  (0.017)** 
Herfindahl (pre-event) * Exposed * Post 1772  -0.022 
  (0.088) 
Constant 0.244 0.228 
 (0.017)*** (0.018)*** 
Year dummies Y Y 
Lender & borrower observables Y Y 
N 384 384 
R2 0.443 0.452 
# lenders 149 149 
Pooled OLS estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new contracts and are 
weighted by the nominal (face) value of the collateral. Haircuts are calculated as the fraction of 
the collateral value that is not financed with a loan. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to 
liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 1772. The interaction between the exposed and 
the post-1772 dummies captures the diff-in-diff effect. The Herfindahl index (0-1) measures the 
concentration of a lender’s portfolio before Christmas 1772. The double interaction between 
Herfindahl and Post 1772 captures whether all lenders with higher degrees of concentration 
charged higher haircuts after Christmas 1772. The triple interaction between Herfindahl, the 
Exposed and Post 1772 captures whether exposed lenders with a higher degree of concentration 
adjusted haircuts more. Lender and borrower observables are as in Table 6. Robust standard 
errors (clustered at the lender level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
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Appendix C: Additional figures and tables 
 
Figure C. 1: Kernel densities haircuts before Christmas 1772 
 
Raw vs corrected for year dummies and borrower fixed effects 
 
Figure C. 2: Surplus on loans to consortium 
  
Distributions of the ‘surplus’ on secured loans (the difference between the value of 
the collateral and the loan), right after the issuing of margin calls on December 29th 
and after the actual execution of the underlying collateral. 
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Figure C. 3: Distribution of EIC returns 
 
Returns calculated over 6 month periods (overlapping). Vertical line indicates the 6 
month return over the second half of 1772.  
 
Figure C. 4: Haircuts before and after Christmas 1772 
Not exposed Exposed 
  
Haircuts before and after Christmas 1772, differentiated by exposed and non-exposed lenders 
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Table C. 1: Haircuts and time since event  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
FE FE FE 
Exposed -0.005 -0.003  -0.000  
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006)  
      
Exposed * Post 1772 0.097 0.086 0.086 0.054 0.101 
 (0.030)*** (0.033)*** (0.046)* (0.030)* (0.045)** 
      
Time since event -0.001 0.023 0.008 -0.065 0.010 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.066) (0.058) (0.073) 
      
Exposed * time since 
event 
-0.051 -0.041 -0.051 -0.031 -0.058 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.042) (0.048) 
      
non-EIC -0.058 -0.055 -0.047 -0.053 -0.046 
 (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.012)*** (0.008)*** (0.014)*** 
      
Constant 0.218 0.244 0.243 0.212 0.460 
 (0.007)*** (0.018)*** (0.026)*** (0.012)*** (0.032)*** 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender FE N N Y N Y 
Borrower FE N N N Y Y 
Lender observables N Y  Y  
Borrower observables N Y Y   
N 418 387 418 387 418 
N (if balanced panel)   166 77 33 
R2 0.334 0.440 0.632 0.659 0.802 
# groups (lenders) 177 152 177 152 177 
# groups (borrowers) 72 70 72 70 72 
Regression estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new contracts and are weighted by the nominal 
(face) value of the collateral. Haircuts are calculated as the fraction of the collateral value that is not financed with a 
loan. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 1772. The 
interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies captures the diff-in-diff effect. ‘Time since event’ is 
measured in years. The interaction between the exposed and ‘time since event’ dummies captures the reversion of 
the treatment effect. For example, in column 3 the immediate treatment effect on haircuts is .08 and decreases by .04 
every year. Lender and borrower observables are as in table 6. Lender and borrower fixed effects are at the 
family/firm level. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table C. 2: Haircuts, excluding January 1773  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
Exposed -0.005 -0.002  -0.001  
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006)  
      
Exposed * Post 1772 0.068 0.058 0.050 0.039 0.060 
 (0.022)*** (0.023)** (0.035) (0.024) (0.037) 
      
non-EIC -0.059 -0.055 -0.047 -0.053 -0.046 
 (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.012)*** (0.008)*** (0.014)*** 
      
Constant 0.218 0.246 0.245 0.210 0.458 
 (0.006)*** (0.016)*** (0.024)*** (0.012)*** (0.034)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lender FE No No Yes No Yes 
Borrower FE No No No Yes Yes 
Lender observables No Yes  Yes  
Borrower observables No Yes Yes   
N 412 381 412 381 412 
N (if balanced panel)   160 73 42 
R2 0.299 0.296 0.229 0.706  
# lenders 177 152 177 152 177 
# borrowers 69 67 69 67 69 
Regression estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new contracts and are weighted by the nominal 
(face) value of the collateral. Observations for January 1773 are excluded. Haircuts are calculated as the fraction of 
the collateral value that is not financed with a loan. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate 
collateral after the events of Christmas 1772. The interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies 
captures the diff-in-diff effect. . Lender and borrower observables are as in table 6. Lender and borrower fixed 
effects are at the family/firm level. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) are reported in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix D: Further robustness checks 
 
Disaggregation of haircut components 
The change in the haircut we document can be disaggregated into two parts – the difference 
between the price at which a contract is signed and the pre-agreed level when a margin call is 
triggered, and the difference between the trigger level and the value of the loan. In Table D. 1, 
we analyse the shift in the haircut for its two components separately. 
In panel A, we examine the difference between market price and the trigger level for a 
margin call. The lenders who were exposed to the default increased the trigger level 
substantially, by 4-5 percent – very close to the change in the overall collateral requirements. In 
panel B, we analyze the distance to loss, the difference between the margin trigger and the value 
of the loan. Here, there are only relatively small and mostly insignificant effects – lenders 
adjusted the risk profile of their lending by demanding margin earlier, and keeping the value of 
the loan overall lower relative to the market value at the time of signing.  
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Table D. 1: Disaggregation of haircut components 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
Panel (A): Distance to margin call  
Exposed -0.009 -0.005  -0.006  
 (0.007) (0.006)  (0.006)  
Exposed * Post 1772 0.063 0.042 0.039 0.028 0.046 
 (0.023)*** (0.024)* (0.036) (0.028) (0.043) 
non-EIC -0.036 -0.029 -0.029 -0.027 -0.031 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.011)*** 
Constant 0.131 0.167 0.167 0.116 0.069 
 (0.006)*** (0.014)*** (0.020)*** (0.009)*** (0.026)*** 
R2 0.135 0.293 0.630 0.534 0.804 
Panel (B): distance to loss  
Exposed 0.004 0.002  0.007  
 (0.006) (0.005)  (0.006)  
Exposed * Post 1772 0.012 0.022 0.025 0.010 0.027 
 (0.012) (0.012)* (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) 
non-EIC -0.024 -0.027 -0.020 -0.027 -0.019 
 (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)** (0.007)*** (0.010)* 
Constant 0.087 0.081 0.088 0.095 0.098 
 (0.005)*** (0.017)*** (0.021)*** (0.008)*** (0.026)*** 
R2 0.306 0.390 0.672 0.614 0.825 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lender FE No No Yes No Yes 
Borrower FE No No No Yes Yes 
Lender observables No Yes  Yes  
Borrower observables No Yes Yes   
N 405 374 405 374 405 
N (if balanced panel)   166 77 33 
# lenders 177 152 177 152 178 
# borrowers 72 70 72 70 72 
Regression estimates for all English securities. Haircut = distance to margin call + distance to 
loss. Observations refer to new contracts and are weighted by the nominal (face) value of the 
collateral. Exposed lenders are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of 
Christmas 1772. The interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies captures the 
diff-in-diff effect. Lender and borrower observables are as in table 6. Lender and borrower fixed 
effects are at the family/firm level. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) are 
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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East India Stock only 
In the baseline results, we use lending against all assets in our database – East India stock (EIC), 
3% annuities, and Bank of England stock. While we control for compositional change, it is 
interesting to examine how much of a shift we can find by focusing on EIC stock exclusively 
(the asset against which the Seppenwolde syndicate predominantly borrowed). 
In Table D. 2, panel A, we show that lending requirements in EIC stock changes in very 
much the same fashion as in the universe of all assets. In the pooled estimation (col 2), the 
coefficient suggests a rise in collateral requirements by 6.8 percent. The fixed effect estimates 
look very similar to the benchmark numbers in . However, estimates become (borderline) 
insignificant. This is because with fixed effects, the effective number of observations that can be 
used to identify the interaction effect is constrained to those that are in the sample before and 
after 1772. In addition, we lose observations by constraining the sample to EIC transactions.  
In panel B, we analyze lending against non-EIC assets only. Due to the limited number of 
observations, the fixed effect specifications cannot be estimated. The pooled OLS estimates are 
very similar to those for loan contracts collateralized with EIC stock. For example, the estimate 
of the interaction effect in col 2 is 6.6% (versus 6.8% in panel A). Overall, there is no reason to 
think that the estimated effects in our baseline specification only reflect changes in haircuts in 
one type of asset. 
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Table D. 2: Haircuts – different types of collateral 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
Panel (A): EIC only      
Exposed -0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.015 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) (0.016) 
Exposed * Post 1772 0.072 0.068 0.074 0.037 0.055 
 (0.025)*** (0.028)** (0.045) (0.026) (0.044) 
Constant 0.222 0.240 0.225 0.210 0.169 
 (0.006)*** (0.016)*** (0.032)*** (0.013)*** (0.046)*** 
N 314 288 314 288 314 
N (if balanced panel)   134 65 41 
# lenders 147 127 147 127 147 
# borrowers 60 57 60 57 60 
R2 0.132 0.296 0.561 0.599 0.787 
Panel (B): BoE, SSC and 3% Annuities 
Exposed -0.007 -0.005    
 (0.008) (0.007)    
Exposed * Post 1772 0.102 0.066    
 (0.016)*** (0.027)**    
Constant 0.158 0.226    
 (0.007)*** (0.019)***    
N 104 99    
# lenders 70 64    
# borrowers 27 26    
R2 0.072 0.284    
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lender FE No No Yes No Yes 
Borrower FE No No No Yes Yes 
Lender observables No Yes  Yes  
Borrower observables No Yes Yes   
Regression estimates for EIC and BoE, SSC and 3% Annuities separately. Observations refer to 
new contracts and are weighted by the nominal (face) value of the collateral. Haircuts are 
calculated as the fraction of the collateral value that is not financed with a loan. Exposed lenders 
are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 1772. The 
interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies captures the diff-in-diff effect. 
Lender and borrower observables are as in table 6. Lender and borrower fixed effects are at the 
family/firm level. Due to a limited number of observations the fixed effects models cannot be 
estimated for the non-EIC securities. Robust standard errors (clustered at the lender level) are 
reported in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Outliers 
It is possible that a few, extreme values for the haircuts influence our results. A standard way to 
deal with this issue is to winsorize the data. We winsorize the top and bottom 5 percent of 
observations, and re-estimate (see Table D. 3). The results are largely unchanged. Coefficients 
are significant throughout, and are statistically indistinguishable from those in the baseline 
specification. For completeness we do the same for interest rates and reestimate our benchmark 
results . Again, results are virtually unchanged.  
 
Table D. 3: Haircuts – Winsorized dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled OLS Pooled OLS FE FE FE 
Exposed -0.005 -0.003  -0.001  
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.006)  
Exposed * Post 1772 0.072 0.064 0.060 0.040 0.059 
 (0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0.032)* (0.022)* (0.031)* 
Non-EIC -0.057 -0.054 -0.047 -0.051 -0.045 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)*** (0.014)*** 
Constant 0.219 0.240 0.236 0.214 0.199 
 (0.006)*** (0.014)*** (0.022)*** (0.011)*** (0.033)*** 
R2 0.369 0.470 0.677 0.655 0.842 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender FE N N Y N Y 
Borrower FE N N N Y Y 
Lender observables N Y  Y  
Borrower observables N Y Y   
N 418 387 418 387 418 
N (if balanced panel)   166 77 33 
# lenders 177 152 177 152 177 
# borrowers 72 70 72 70 72 
Regression estimates for all English securities. Observations refer to new contracts. Haircuts are 
calculated as the fraction of the collateral value that is not financed with a loan. Exposed lenders 
are those who were forced to liquidate collateral after the events of Christmas 1772. The 
interaction between the exposed and the post-1772 dummies captures the diff-in-diff effect. 
Observations are weighted by the nominal (face) value of the collateral; the top and bottom 5% 
of the haircut distribution are Winsorized. Lender and borrower observables are as in table 6. 
Lender and borrower fixed effects are at the family/firm level. Robust standard errors (clustered 
at the lender level) are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Extreme observations 
The final step is to examine the sensitivity of our results to the influence of a single lender or 
borrower. To this end, we re-estimate the baseline specification (Table 7, col 2), dropping one 
lender or borrower at a time. Figure D. 1 panels A-D shows the distribution of coefficients (first 
row) and t-statistics (second row). The range of estimated coefficients is small, with results 
ranging from 5.5 to 7.5 percent. The t-statistics never falls below 2. This shows that our results 
are not driven by a single lender or borrower. 
 
Figure D. 1: Outlier analysis, dropping one lender (borrower) at a time 
Dropping one lender at a time Dropping one borrower at a time 
(A) Coefficient estimate (B) Coefficient estimate 
  
(C) t-statistic (D) t-statistic 
  
Coefficients on the interaction effect and t-statistics are generated dropping one lender (or borrower) at 
a time. All estimates include lender and borrower observables.  
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Appendix E: Mathematical Proofs
Proof. of Proposition 1. A borrower’s expected profit from a risk free loan lj (for j = 1; 2)
is given by
E[ j lj = lj ] = qj (v3   p)
where q is the total number of assets a type 3 agent can purchase after obtaining loan
lj = rj . Plugging in for c = qj (p  rj) we obtain
E[ j lj = lj ] =
c
p  rj
(v3   p) (3)
Consider lj > rj . For a lender j to make zero expected returns from his perspective
(remember that by assumption borrowers hold all bargaining power) the interest rate  is
set as
(lj) =
lj   rj
lj
(4)
First consider a loan size blj so that the borrower does not expect to default in the the
bad state. In this case the borrower’s expected profits are given by
E[ j lj = blj] = c
p  blj
h
v3   p  (blj)blji (5)
After plugging in for (lj) the difference between profits (5) and (3) can be written as
E[ j lj = blj]  E[ j lj = lj ]
=
c 
p  rj

(p  blj)
h 
p  rj
 
v3   p  blj + rj+ p  blj (v3   p)i
=
c 
p  rj

(p  blj)(blj   rj)| {z }
>0
[(v3   r) + 2(vj   p)]| {z }
<0
< 0
where vj   p < 0 follows directly from the assumption that agents of type j do not want
to hold the asset directly.
Next consider the case of a loan size elj so that the borrower does expect to default in
the the bad state. Then (after plugging in for (lj)) we arrive at
E[ j lj = elj] = c
2
"
1
p  elj

r   p  elj + rj  1
#
=
c
2
1
p  elj  r + rj   2p = cp  elj| {z }
>0
(vj   p)| {z }
<0
< 0
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Proof. of Proposition 2. We first describe the equilibrium.
(1) Asset holdings.
Denote by qj the asset holdings of a borrower who is either matched with a type 1 or
2 lender (q1, q2) or is not matched at all (q0, for which we introduce l0 = r0 = 0). From
Proposition 1 it follows that
qj =
c3
p  rj
; j = 0; 1; 2
where q0 < q1 < q2.
(2) Value functions
The value functions of obtaining a loan of type j = 0; 1; 2 are given by
V0 = q0(v3   p) + (1  )



N1
N1 +N2
V1 +
N2
N1 +N2
V2

+ (1  )V0

(6a)
V1 = q1(v3   p) + (1  ) [V0 + (1  )V1] (6b)
V2 = q2(v3   p) + (1  ) [V0 + (1  )V1] (6c)
where V2 > V1 and where we focus on the situation where V0  V1.
(3) Flow equations and market clearing
Expression (1) in the proposition is the steady state flow equation which equates the
number of new matches to the number of matches that are ended. Expression (2) states
that, in proportion to their importance in the total population, type 1 and 2 agents are
equally likely to be found by a borrower. Solving for Mj gives
Mj =
Ni
N1 +N2

+ 
N3 (7)
Asset market clearing gives
1 = M0q0 +M1q1 +M2q2 (8)
where M0 = N3  M1  M2. This implicitly defines price p. Together these expressions
fully describe the equilibrium.
We then proof the Proposition.
Denote
1 =
N1
N1 +N2
2 =
N2
N1 +N2
We use these expressions to simplify the value functions V0 and V1. Start with V0 in (6a).
Noting that 1 + 2 = 1 and summing V1 (6b) and V2 (6c) we get that
1V1 + 2V2 =
(v3   p) (1q1 + 2q2) + (1  )V0
1  (1  )(1  )
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The expression for V0 can be then restated as
V0 = q0(v3   p) + (1  ) [ (1V1 + 2V2) + (1  )V0]
= (v3   p)q0( + (1  )) + (1  )(1q1 + 2q2)
 + (+ )(1  )
In a similar fashion
V1 =
q1(v3   p) + (1  )V0
+    
The condition V0  V1 can be written as
V0  q1(v3   p)
Which is equivalent to the following condition
q0( + (1  )) + (1  )(1q1 + 2q2)
 + (+ )(1  ) < q1 (9)
We use our flow expression (7) and market clearing (8) to simplify. In comination with the
flow equation, market clearing can be written as
q0
N3
+ 
+ 1q1
N3
+ 
+ 2q2
N3
+ 
= 1
q0+ (1q1 + 2q2) =
+ 
N3
1q1 + 2q2 =
+ 
N3
  c3
p


Plugging this into condition (9) and noting that qj = c3p rj we arrive at
 c3
p
+ (1  )+
N3
 + (+ )(1  ) <
c3
p  r1
Denote the likelihood ratio  = 
1  . Then this condition can be rewritten as
p2   (r1 +N3c3) p 
N3c3
+ 
< 0
This quadratic formula only has one positive root that defines p. The quadratic is U-shaped.
This means that the statement is negative iff p < p.
Proof. of Lemma 1.
Denote
hj = 1 
rj
p
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This implies that
h1
r1
=  
p  r1 pr1
p2
Since r1 < p this means that h1r1 < 0 if
p
r1
< 1. Market clearing (8) implies that
1
c3
=
M0
p
+
M1
p  r1
+
M2
p  r2
Implicit derivation yields
0 <
p
r1
=
"
1 +
M0
M1
(p  r1)2
p2
+
M2
M1
(p  r1)2
(p  r2)2
# 1
< 1
Similarly,
h2
r1
=
r2
p
p
r1
> 0
Proof. of Lemma 2.
The first part of this Lemma works purely through prices.
hj
N3
=
rj
p2
p
N3
Noting that
M0 +M1 +M2 = N3
it is straightforward to see from the market clearing condition that
p
N3
> 0
Secondly, note that
h1   h2 = r2   r1
p
so that
 (h1   h2)
N3
< 0
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Appendix F: Primary Sources 
 
GAR: Gemeentearchief Rotterdam (City Archives Rotterdam); NA: Nationaal Archief (Dutch 
National Archives); OSA: Oud Archief van de Stad Rotterdam (Old Archives City of 
Rotterdam); SAA: Stadsarchief Amsterdam (City Archives Amsterdam) 
SAA (library), ‘Stukken betreffende den boedel van Clifford en Zoonen’, 1773-1779 
SAA, Notariële protocollen Daniel van den Brink, 5075: 10,593 - 10,613 (various notary 
protocols) 
SAA, Tex den Bondt aanvulling 1 en 2, 30269: 347 (‘Staat en inventaris van de boedel van 
Johannes van Seppenwolde’) 
SAA, Archief van de Stads Beleenkamer, 5043: 1 (‘Notulen van de vergaderingen van het 
‘Fonds tot maintien van het publiek crediet’ (1773)’) 
NA, Archief van de familie Van der Staal van Piershil, 3.20.54: 381, 386, 396 (various 
correspondence) 
OSA, 1.01: 3710 (‘Stukken betreffende de kasgeldlening groot fl. 300.000 door de stad aan J. en 
H. van Seppenwolde, kooplieden te Amsterdam’) 
GAR, Archief van de Maatschappij van Assurantie,  Belening, etc., 199: 5, 40, 354 (various 
accounts and letters) 
GAR, Archief van Kuyls Fundatie,  90: 52, 56 (various letters) 
De Koopman, Vol. IV ( 1772-1773) (Dutch periodical) 
 
